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LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS
SOME OVERALL OBSERVATIONS ABOUT THE 1996
NEW YORK STATE ENVIRONMENTAL BOND ACT AND
A CLOSER LOOK AT TITLE 5 AND ITS APPROACH TO
THE "BROWNFIELDS" DILEMMA
David L. Markell*
I. INTRODUCTION
Touted by proponents as a "bold and fiscally responsible initiative
designed to attack the pressing problems that threaten to foul New
York State's water and dirty its air,"' the $1.75 billion environmen-
tal bond act (1996 Act) approved by the state's voters in November
1996 is certain to have a significant impact for years to come on the
state's environment, and on the shape of New York's environmental
protection efforts.2 The General Counsel of the Conference of
* Associate Professor, Albany Law School. Kristen Mollnow, Albany Law School Class of
1997, and Dakin Lecakes, Albany Law School Class of 1998, provided valuable research
assistance in connection with this Article. Several New York State government officials,
environmental group leaders, and industry representatives involved in the negotiations that
produced the 1996 Bond Act provided helpful feedback on earlier drafts of this Article. Of
course, I take full responsibility for any errors that remain.
Governor Proposes "Clean Water, Clean Air" Bond Act, N.Y. ExEcuTIVE CHAMBER PRESS
RELEASE (June 6, 1996).
2 The official title of the Act is Implementation of the Clean Water/Clean Air Bond Act of
1996 [hereinafter 1996 Bond Act]. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW §§ 56-0101 to 56-0611
(McKinney Supp. 1997) [hereinafter ECLI. It was signed into law by Governor Pataki in
August 1996 and ratified by New York voters in November 1996.
Several helpful sources provide histories of New York's approaches to environmental
protection. Three of the more comprehensive, recent sources are: 1) NELSON A. ROCKEFELLER
INST. GOV'T, THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION: A 25TH ANNIVERSARY
REVIEW (1996) [hereinafter A 25TH ANNIVERSARY REVIEW]; 2) Outlook on 25 Years of the DEC:
Environmental Officials Remember the Past and Provide a Blueprint for the Future of
Environmental Regulations, ALB. L. ENVTL. OUTLOOK (Spring 1996); and 3) Symposium, 25th
Anniversary of the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation: Past and Future
Challenges and Directions, 7 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. (forthcoming Spring 1997). See also N.Y.
DEP'T ENVTL. CONSERVATION, OFF. PROGRAM & POLy ANALYSIS, THE DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION: A PROGRAM AND BUDGET HISTORY FISCAL YEARS 1983-1984
1217
Albany Law Review
Mayors and Municipal Officials,3 Donna M. C. Giliberto, has
suggested that the 1996 Bond Act has the potential to be "heralded
as the single most important environmental development in the
State of New York since the 1965 Pure Waters Bond Act."4 Larry
Shapiro, a senior attorney with the New York Public Interest
Research Group (NYPIRG), similarly characterized approval of the
1996 Bond Act as an "important moment in New York State's
environmental history."5
Perhaps not surprisingly, given the substantial stakes and sums
of money involved,6 the debate over the 1996 Bond Act spawned
energetic, well-funded efforts pro and con.7 Advocates of the 1996
Bond Act included a wide array of environmental groups.8 In a
contest which saw more than its share of unlikely alliances, many of
the state's premier business organizations supported enactment as
well, including the Business Council,' which has been referred to as
"the state's most influential business lobbying organization."
10
Supporters sought to convince the voters of the importance of the
1996 Bond Act as an investment in the future. The following
THROUGH 1990-1991 (Oct. 1991) (discussing the Department of Environmental Conservation's
[hereinafter DEC] appropriations relative to the Department's legislative mandates).
I The Conference of Mayors and Municipal Officials is a voluntary membership association
which represents villages and cities in New York. See Donna M.C. Giliberto, The Bond Act:
Re.establishing the State-Local Partnership, ALB. L. ENVTL. OUTLOOK (forthcoming Spring
1997) (manuscript at 3 n.1, on file with the ALB. L. ENvTL. OUTLOOK).
' Id. (manuscript at 8). Ms. Giliberto notes that the "devil is always in the details" and
"[o]nly time will tell" whether the 1996 Bond Act meets the expectations many have set for it.
Id.
, Larry Shapiro, The Hard Work Lies Ahead-Implementation of the Bond Act, ALB. L.
ENVTL. OUTLOOK (forthcoming Spring 1997) (manuscript at 10, on file with the ALB. L. ENVTL.
OUTLOOK).
' The 1996 Bond Act is the largest environmental bond act ever enacted in the state. See
infra note 12 (tracing enactment of such bond acts over the past thirty years).
' Proponents of the 1996 Bond Act raised well over $1 million. See Sarah Metzgar, State's
Voters Approve Environmental Bond Act, TIMES UNION (Albany, NY), Nov. 6, 1996, at A9. One
opponent, Change-NY, raised over $400,000 for advertising against the 1996 Bond Act. See
id.
' See Governor Pataki Signs Clean Water, Clean Air Bond Act, N.Y. EXECUTIVE CHAMBER
PRESS RELEASE (Aug. 1, 1996) (listing 20 environmental groups that endorsed the 1996 Bond
Act); see also Shapiro, supra note 5 (manuscript at 1) (noting that "[tihose of us who work at
NYPIRG were elated... when we received word that the Bond Act had been approved by New
York State voters"). Mr. Shapiro notes that NYPIRG "put 1500 volunteers on the streets in
key election districts ... in a successful effort to inform voters about the merits of
the ... measure." Id.
' The Governor's August 1 press release reported that other supporters included the New
York Conference of Mayors and the New York Association of Towns. See Governor Pataki
Signs Clean Water, Clean Air Bond Act, supra note 8, at 1.
'0 Metzgar, supra note 7, at A16.
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statement from the Governor's Office, contained in its memorandum
in support of the 1996 Bond Act, captures many of the points made
by the Act's advocates:
The Clean Water/Clean Air Bond Act of 1996 is a bond act
for our future. It will allow the state to make necessary
commitments to undertake urgently needed environmental
improvement projects that are vital to New York's future.
This bond act is a necessary investment for solving pressing
public health and environmental problems of growing concern
to the people of the state .... The People of the State of New
York understand the benefits that clean water and clean air
provide and are committed to passing on to their children a
cleaner and safer environment than the one they inherited.
This bond act will help fulfill our responsibility to the future
of our state's environment and the health of future
generations.11
"Strange bedfellows" also found themselves aligned as opponents
of the 1996 Bond Act, seeking to ensure its defeat at the polls.
Liberal Democrats joined forces with fiscal conservatives such as
Change-NY to argue that New York, already the nation's most
heavily indebted state, could ill afford to incur additional indebted-
ness." Some of these opponents touted an alternative "pay-as-you-
11 GOVERNOR'S MEMORANDUM, PROGRAM BILL #129R & 130R, at 6 (N.Y. 1996) [hereinafter
PROGRAM BIL #129R & 130R].
12 See Metzgar, supra note 7, at A16. Under the 1996 Bond Act as approved, revenues from
the Real Estate Transfer Tax will be used to pay the debt service on the bonds. See Michael
J. Bragman, Editorial, The Trouble with Environmental Bonds, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 1996, at
A19.
The 1996 Bond Act is by no means the state's first experience with bonding for such
purposes. As former DEC Executive Deputy Commissioner Gary Spielmann noted in a 1996
article published prior to the adoption of the 1996 Bond Act, "[tlo provide for environmental
infrastructure, New York has relied heavily on debt-financed... programs." Gary Spielmann,
The Evolution of the DEC: Budget and Funding Sources, 1970-1995, ALB. L. ENVTL. OUTLOOK,
Spring 1996, at 21, 24. The state has actually been on a bond act per decade schedule. In
1965 the state enacted a $1 billion Pure Waters Bond Act to provide funding for construction
and operation of municipal sewage treatment facilities. See N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW §§ 7371-7373
(McKinney 1979); A 25TH ANNIVERSARY REVIEW, supra note 2, at 210. Seven years later, the
state adopted the Environmental Quality Bond Act, which made available a total of $1.15
billion for various improvements to the environmental infrastructure in the state. See ECL
§§ 51-0101 to 51-1105 (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1997); see also A 25TH ANNIVERSARY REVIEW,
supra note 2, at 202 (describing the Environmental Quality Bond Act of 1972). In the mid-
1980s, the state enacted the Environmental Quality Bond Act of 1986. See ECL §§ 52-0101 to
52-0911 (McKinney Supp. 1997); A 25TH ANNIVERSARY REVIEW, supra note 2, at 164. Proceeds
from this bond act were to be targeted primarily towards remediation of contaminated waste
sites. See A 25TH ANNIVERSARY REVIEW, supra note 2, at 165. A portion of these funds were
to be available to reimburse local governments for the cost of remediating municipal landfills.
1997] 1219
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go" approach to funding the environmental projects contemplated
under the 1996 Bond Act.13  As Michael J. Bragman, the
Democratic Majority Leader of the New York State Assembly, put it:
"The bond act would ... add billions to New York State's already
staggering debt. Dollar for dollar, New York already has sig-
nificantly more debt than any other state.... [T]he pay-as-you-go
approach is not only preferable, it is actually quite feasible."14
Further, opponents highlighted the concern that the 1996 Bond Act
would "fund pork-barrel projects."15
On November 6, 1996 New York voters approved the $1.75 billion
Environmental Bond Act. 16  Roughly fifty-five percent of those
voting "pull[ed] the 'yes' lever" in favor of the 1996 Bond Act. 7 The
See id. ($100 million was made available for this purpose). In short, the 1996 Bond Act is the
fourth environmental bond act to be enacted since 1965. In addition to the three earlier bond
acts described in the text, an environmental bond act proposed in 1990, known as the 21st
Century Environmental Quality Bond Act, was defeated at the polls by less than 100,000 votes.
See id.; Giliberto, supra note 3 (manuscript at 5).
For a discussion of alternative mechanisms for financing environmental programs, see U.S.
ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, ALTERNATIVE FINANCING MECHANISMS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
PROGRAMS: STATE CAPACITY TASK FORCE THE ALTERNATIVE FINANCING MECHANISMS TEAM
REPORT, FINAL DRAFT (1992). This report notes that while historically, the federal, state and
local governments have shared responsibility for environmental protection,
"[i]ncreasingly .... the responsibility of implementing, administering and enforcing federally
mandated environmental programs has shifted to the states." Id. at 1.
In New York State, as former DEC Executive Deputy Commissioner Gary Spielmann, the
Rockefeller Institute, and others have pointed out, a variety of sources of funding exist for
environmental protection efforts. See A 25TH ANNIVERSARY REVIEW, supra note 2, at 6 (noting
that the DEC administers more than 200 special revenue accounts, at a "steep price"). The
State Revolving Fund (SRF), administered by the state's Environmental Facilities Corporation
(EFC), is a major source of environmental infrastructure funding support. See N.Y. COMP.
CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6, § 649 (1994) [hereinafter NYCRR]; NYCRR tit. 21, § 2602 (1993). The
SRF makes low-cost financing available to local governments to help make affordable a variety
of environmental infrastructure projects. See id.; Terry Agriss, Financing New York's Environ-
mental Future, ALB. L. ENVTL. OUTLOOK (forthcoming Spring 1997) (manuscript at 3, on file
with the ALB. L. ENVTL. OUTLOOK); Giliberto, supra note 3 (manuscript at 3).
The Environmental Protection Fund (EPF), enacted in 1993, is one relatively new source of
funding for environmental projects. See N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 92-S (McKinney Supp. 1997);
STATE OF NEW YORK, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION FUND (EFP) INFORMATION 5 (1994). This
Fund establishes a dedicated revenue stream for a variety of environmental projects, such as
landfill closures and municipal recycling activities. See id. I
" See A. 11332, 219th Leg., 1996 Sess. (N.Y.); Metzgar, supra note 7, at A16 (citing State
Assembly Majority Leader Bragman as a proponent of "pay-as-you-go").
14 Bragman, supra note 12, at A19.
15 Metzgar, supra note 7, at A16. Larry Shapiro, Senior Attorney for NYPIRG, has
identified a series of steps the government should take to maximize accountability in the
expenditure of funds, to minimize the possibility for the practice of "pork barrel" politics. See
Shapiro, supra note 5 (manuscript at 1).
" See Metzgar, supra note 7, at A9.
17 See id.
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1996 Bond Act received a very different reception in various regions
of the state. Perhaps the most vivid statistic was that seventy-seven
percent: of those voting in New York City voted in favor of the 1996
Bond Act, while a majority of voters in the rest of the state opposed
it.18
The remainder of this introduction offers some observations about
the 1996 Bond Act in connection with the ongoing debate over
"unfunded mandates." 9 The introduction also identifies the major
components of the 1996 Bond Act. The heart of this Article, Section
II, focuses on one title of the 1996 Bond Act, Title 5, which covers the
remediation of what have come to be known in New York and
nationally as "brownfields" sites-that is, sites that are contaminated
or suspected to be contaminated, and whose contamination is
arguably deterring reuse or redevelopment.2"
A See id.
19 See David L. Markell, The Role of Local Governments in Environmental Regulation:
Shoring Up Our Federal System, 44 SYRACUSE L. REV. 885, 892-95 (1993) (summarizing local
government perspectives on the issue of unfunded mandates and offering several suggestions
for addressing this aspect of the federal-state-local relationship).
20 The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has defined brownfield sites as
"abandoned, idled, or under-used industrial and commercial facilities where expansion or
redevelopment is complicated by real or perceived environmental contamination." U.S. ENvTL.
PROTECTION AGENCY, OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE AND RESPONSE, EPA/54O/R-94/068, THE
BROWNFIELDS ECONOMIC REDEVELOPMENT INITIATIVE: APPLICATION GUIDELINES FOR
:,DEMONSTRATION PILOTS #2 (Sept. 1995) [hereinafter GUIDELINES].
. While federal environmental programs, including the federal Superfund law and the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act [hereinafter
CERCLA], have spawned substantial literature, see, e.g., THOMAS W. CHURCH & ROBERT T.
NAKAMuRA, CLEANING UP THE MESS: IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGIES IN SUPERFUND (1993);
ALLAN J. TOPOL & REBECCA SNOW, SUPERFUND LAW AND PROCEDURE (1992); Frederick R.
Anderson, Negotiation and Informal Agency Action: The Case of Superfund, 1985 DUKE L.J. 261
(1985); Richard C. Belthoff, Private Cost Recovery Actions Under Section 107 of CERCLA, 11
* COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 141 (1986); Craig N. Johnston, Superfund Reauthorization: Who Decides
Who's Liable Under CERCLA?: EPA Slips a Bombshell into the CERCLA Reauthorization
Process, 24 ENVTL. L. 1045 (1994); Sharon L. McCarthy, Note, CERCLA Cleanup Costs Under
Comprehensive General Liability Insurance Policies: Property Damage or Economic Damage?,
56 FORDHAM L. REV. 1169 (1988), relatively little attention has been paid to state environmen-
ital activities. See 1 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INST., LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION § 6.01[1]
(Sheldon M. Novick et al. eds., 1994) (noting the almost total emphasis on federal en-
vironmental law found in treatises, law review articles, and popular publications); David L.
Markell, A How-to Guide to the Practice of Environmental Law, 2 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 360, 364
(1993) (book review) (noting that the same is true for environmental case books including, by
way of example, JOHN E. BONINE & THOMAS 0. MCGARiTY, THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION (2d ed. 1992); ROGER W. FINDLEY & DANIEL A. FARBER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW:
CASES AND MATERIALS (3d ed. 1992); ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE AND POLICY (1992)); see also David L. Markell, The Federal Super-
fund Program: Proposals For Strengthening The Federal/State Relationship, 18 WM. & MARY
J. ENVTL. L. n.27 (1993) [hereinafter Markell, Federal Superfund]. This is so despite the
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One commentator has suggested that in recent years the issue of
"unfunded governmental mandates" has been "'the number one
intergovernmental issue in the United States due to the cumulative
impact of state and federal mandates."'' Environmental re-
quirements contained in federal and state law are prominent among
these mandates.22 In the words of a resolution adopted by one local
government, unfunded mandates represent a "'breach [of] the
underlying principles of federalism which assume[] a working
partnership and shared responsibilities between [sic] federal, state
and local governments."'23  A 1993 report by the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) expressed the sentiment that local concerns
had reached a crisis stage: "We are going to see a revolution by local
governments. They will say, 'EPA, if you want it done then do it
yourself."'24
The federal government responded to this locally-led insurrection
by enacting, inter alia, the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of
1995.25 As its title suggests, this federal legislation is intended to
central role states play in our federal system. See ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INST., REPORT TO THE
OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, NEW STATE AND LOCAL APPROACHES TO ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION at iv (Aug. 1993) ("Many environmental laws and programs originate with state
and local governments. These include innovative approaches to environmental regulation as
well as other approaches used in lieu of, or as supplements to, regulatory mechanisms."); David
L. Markell, States as Innovators: It's Time for a New Look to our "Laboratories of Democracy"
in the Effort to Improve Our Approach to Environmental Regulation, 58 ALB. L. REV. 348 (1994)
(commenting on state approaches to environmental regulation) [hereinafter Markell, States as
Innovators]; JAMES M. MCELFISH, JR. & JOHN PENDERGRASS, ENVTL. LAW INST., RESEARCH
BRIEF NO. 2, REAUTHORIZING SUPERFUND: LESSONS FROM THE STATES 4 (Dec. 1993) (discussing
state innovations in the Superfund arena).
21 Markell, supra note 19, at 889 (quoting Dr. Bruce McDowell of the Advisory Commission
on Intergovernmental Relations, INTERNATIONAL CITY/COUNTY MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION
(ICMA), ENVIRONMENTAL MANDATES TASK FORCE MEETING, MEETING NOTES, at 1 (Mar. 5,
1993)). See also Shelley Emling, Mandates Drying Up County Funds Enough, ATLANTA J. &
CONST., Aug. 14, 1993, at B1 (stating that "[giripes about unfunded mandates are not new, but
they're growing louder as the demands grow more costly").
2 See Markell, supra note 19, at 886.
2 Id. at 889 (quoting DEKALB COUNTY, GEORGIA, RESOLUTION (Aug. 10, 1993)).
Id. at 888-89 (quoting U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, LOCAL GOVERNMENT IMPLEMEN-
TATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL MANDATES, FIVE CASE STUDIES, FINAL REPORT, at B32 (Aug.
1993)).
25 2 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1571 (Supp. 1 1995). This Act is only one of many federal actions within
the past few years intended to address the issue of unfunded mandates in one way or another.
Another federal effort to respond to unfunded mandate concerns is the creation of a new
revolving loan fund as an important element of the recently amended Safe Drinking Water Act.
See Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-182, § 130, 110 Stat. 1613
(to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300j-12) (providing for the establishment of loan funds to aid
municipalities in complying with federal regulations). See also Contract with America
Advancement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-121, 110 Stat. 847 (requiring, inter alia,
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limit the imposition of unfunded federal mandates on state and local
governments.26 It does not bar unfunded mandates altogether.
Instead, it imposes various requirements on a federal entity
considering imposing a mandate.27
The 1996 Bond Act represents a response by the State of New York
to this concern on the part of local governments that they are being
saddled with environmental obligations without being provided
adequate support to implement them. The 1996 Bond Act will funnel
significant sums of money to local governments for purposes of
developing or upgrading environmental infrastructure. 28  Con-
ference of Mayors General Counsel Donna M.C. Giliberto indicated,
in a recent article, that "cities and villages around New York State
breathed a collective sigh of relief' when the voters approved the
1996 Bond Act.29  After summarizing the frustration local
government officials in New York have felt in recent years when
responding to environmental mandates,"° she stated that local
government officials "view[] [the] Bond Act as a significant step
toward... protecting local governments from burdensome unfunded
environmental mandates." 1
Elaborating on the financial relief she expects the 1996 Bond Act
will provide local governments, Giliberto states:
Once implemented, [the 1996 Bond Act] would provide local
real property tax relief by targeting existing environmental
mandates such as safe drinking water, sewage treatment
congressional and General Accounting Office review of agency regulations); Regulatory
Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 601-612 (1994). See generally Daniel Cohen & Peter L. Strauss,
Congressional Review of Agency Regulations, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 95, 96 (1997); Jeffrey S.
Lubbers, Paperwork Redux: The (Stronger) Paper Reduction Act of 1995, 49 ADMIN. L. REV.
111 (1997); Symposium, The Future of the American Administrative Process, 49 ADMIN. L. REV.
1 (1997).
' See 2 U.S.C. § 1501(2). The statute also covers imposition of mandates on tribal
governments. See id.
' See id. See, e.g., id. § 1532(a) (requiring that agencies considering imposition of mandates
which "may result in the expenditure by State, local, and tribal governments, in the ag-
gregate[] ... of $100,000,000 or more.., in any [one] year," prepare a written statement that,
inter alia, assesses the benefits and costs of the proposed rule and the extent to which federal
financial assistance is available to meet the costs of complying with the requirement). See
Daniel E. Troy, The Unfunded Mandates Act of 1995, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 139 (1997).
' While a significant portion of the 1996 Bond Act funds are to be provided to
municipalities, some of the funds may be used for other purposes. See, e.g., ECL § 56-0301
(McKinney Supp. 1997) (including state agency "environmental compliance assistance projects"
on the list of potentially eligible projects).
Giliberto, supra note 3 (manuscript at 5).
3 See id. (manuscript at 1).
3' Id. (manuscript at 5).
1997] 1223
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plant upgrades, recycling centers, and landfill closures.
Without the resources of the Bond Act, local governments
would be required to comply with these federal and state
mandates by continuing to rely on the local real property
tax.
32
Ms. Giliberto observes that "the majority of the programs funded
with Bond Act proceeds are existing federal and state mandates."33
She continues:
The bottom line is, with or without the proceeds of the Bond
Act, local governments are required to comply with these
mandates. Without the Bond Act, communities would be
forced to "go it alone," but by providing significant state
resources to assist local government environmental
compliance, the State of New York has eased the financial
burden associated with these unfunded mandates and has
taken an important step toward reestablishing its partnership
with local governments.34
The 1996 Bond Act contains five main titles: (1) "Title 2--Safe
Drinking Water Act Projects" ($355 million); 5 (2) "Title 3-Clean
Water Projects" ($690 million);36 (3) "Title 4-Solid Waste Projects"
($175 million);37 (4) "Title 5-Environmental Restoration Projects"
($200 million);38 and (5) "Title 6-Air Quality Projects" ($230
million).39 The remainder of this Article focuses on Title 5, which
provides funding to municipalities for remediation of "brownfields"
sites.
II. TITLE 5 OF THE 1996 NEW YORK STATE CLEAN WATER/CLEAN
AIR ACT: ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION PROJECTS
Despite its title, the reach of the $1.75 billion 1996 Bond Act
extends beyond providing state funds to protect the state's water and
air quality.4 ° Title 5 of the 1996 Bond Act allocates a total of $200
32 Id.
"' Id. (manuscript at 6).
34 Id.
35 ECL § 56-0201 (McKinney Supp. 1997).
.3 Id. §§ 56-0301 to 56-0311.
3' Id. §§ 56-0401 to 56-0407.
" Id. §§ 56-0501 to 56-0511.
3' Id. §§ 56-0601 to 56-0611.
40 See id. §§ 56-0401 to 56-0407 (stating that Title 4 authorizes funds for municipal landfill
and recycling projects); id. §§ 56-0501 to 56-0511 (stating that Title 5 authorizes funds for
municipal projects remediating and restoring property).
[Vol. 601224
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million for "environmental restoration projects,"41 which will result
in the remediation of contaminated sites.42 In the words of the
memorandum submitted by the Governor's office in support of the
1996 Bond Act, Title 5 is "for clean-up of abandoned industrial sites.
These 'brownfield' sites will then be used for open space or returned
to productive use."43
The notion that a concerted effort is needed to remediate aban-
doned or underutilized industrial sites, more commonly known as
brownfields sites, has become increasingly popular in recent years.
44
Last fall, President Clinton, for example, is said to have charac-
terized brownfields redevelopment as one of his priorities.4'5 Among
many initiatives at the federal level, one recently proposed bill would
provide $2 billion in tax incentives for cleaning up these sites.46
4' Id. § 56-0501. An environmental restoration project is defined as "a project to investigate
or to remediate hazardous substances located on real property held in title by a municipality."
Id.
12 The 1996 Bond Act represents a substantial additional investment by the people of New
York in the cleanup of contaminated properties. See Act of July 27, 1982, ch. 857, 1982 N.Y.
Laws 2795 (creating a fund for remediation of inactive hazardous waste disposal sites). The
1986 Environmental Quality Bond Act (EQBA) provided in excess of $1 billion for the cleanup
of inactive hazardous waste disposal sites. See ECL § 52-0103 (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1997);
Town of New Windsor v. Tesa Tuck, Inc., 919 F. Supp. 662, 667 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); see also
STAFF REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE NEW YORK STATE JOINT LEGISLATIVE COMMISSION ON
Toxic SUBSTANCES & HAZARDOUS WASTES, THE VOLUNTARY CLEANUP OF NEW YoRK's
CONTAMINATED PROPERTY: BARRIERS & INCENTIVES 14 n.22 (Oct. 1994) [hereinafter BARRIERS
& INCENTIVES] (stating that "$1.1 billion is now available for site cleanup").
43 PROGRAM BILL # 129R & 130R, supra note 11, at 3. See also Robert S. Berger,
Brownfields: The New York Approach, ENvTL. L. N.Y., Jan. 1995, at 1 (1995) (discussing the
brownfields issue in New York and the state's plan for remediating contaminated properties).
There has been a flurry of activity in many states and at the federal level to encourage
redevelopment of contaminated properties. See Mark D. Anderson, Investing in our Urban In-
dustrial Areas: Encouraging the Voluntary Cleanup of Brownfields, ALB. L. ENVTL. OUTLOOK,
Summer/Fall 1996, at 44, 44 (discussing legislative initiatives aimed at alleviating the
brownfields problem). A news report indicates that President Clinton has characterized
brownfields redevelopment as "the 'most important thing' he is working on with the nation's
mayors." Clinton Outlines Major Environmental Initiatives in Stump Speech, ENVTL. POL'Y
ALERT, Sept. 11, 1996, at 34, 35 [hereinafter Stump Speech]. For a series of articles that
discuss the issue of brownfields from a variety of perspectives, see ALB. L. ENvTL. OUTLOOK,
Summer/Fall 1996.
" See generally ALB. L. ENVTL. OUTLOOK, Summer/Fall 1996 (providing various perspectives
on recent initiatives to cleanup brownfields sites).
"' See Stump Speech, supra note 43, at 35.
46 See House Democrat's Brownfield Measure Would Provide Credit, Tax-Exempt Bonds,
Env't Rep. (BNA) 2070 (Feb. 14, 1997). Similarly, President Clinton has proposed to alter the
tax code to promote redevelopment of abandoned or underutilized industrial sites. See Clinton
Unveils Tax Incentive Plan to Restore 30,000 'Brownfield' Sites, Env't Rep. (BNA) 2140 (Mar.
15, 1996) (stating that "[tihe tax incentive plan is expected to return 30,000 brownfields
properties to productive use across the country and spur $10 billion in private investments").
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The scope of the problem is thought to be quite significant. A
January 1996 study from The United States Conference of Mayors
reports that, based on the Conference's survey, 39 cities that
reported the presence of brownfields in their communities "identified
more than 20,000 such properties or sites of multiple properties.""
The report continues: "While these results do not allow for projec-
tions of total brownfields in the nation, the high counts of sites in
this small sample of cities indicate the problem is a significant
one."
48
The abandonment of brownfields sites due to their potential
contamination has been considered to be partially responsible for a
litany of social ills that have befallen many urban areas in the
United States, including declines in the tax base, reductions in
employment opportunity and the presence of unattractive, underused
or abandoned properties that contribute to an environment of despair
rather than hope.49 At the state level in New York, Charles E.
Sullivan, Chief of the Department of Environmental Conservation's
(DEC) State Superfund and Voluntary Cleanup Practice Group,
summarized this perspective as follows: "Abandoned contaminated
commercial and industrial properties, can constitute public health,
safety, and environmental hazards. They drive down property values
Facilitating cleanups of these properties by allowing parties to "privatize" the oversight
function, at least in part, is another theme that has gained some measure of popularity in Mas-
sachusetts, among other states. See NATIONAL GOVERNORS' ASS'N, IDEAS THAT WORK:
BUSINESS AND ENVIRONMENT 6 (1996). Other strategies urged by the Conference of Mayors
include provision of government financial support to help fund cleanup activities. See Letter
from the U.S. Conference of Mayors to President Clinton (Dec. 21, 1995), reprinted in U.S.
CONF. OF MAYORS, IMPACT OF BROWNFiELDS ON U.S. CITIES: A 39-CITY SURVEY at app. (Jan.
25, 1996). For summaries of the innovations being explored as part of brownfields programs
in Connecticut, Delaware, Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio, Pennsylvania and Virginia, see
NATIONAL GOVERNORS' ASS'N, supra, at 2-20.
47 U.S. CONF. OF MAYORS, IMPACT OF BROWNFIELDS ON U.S. CITIES: A 39-CITY SURVEY 1
(Jan. 25, 1996).
" Id. The U.S. General Accounting Office reports that the U.S. Conference of Mayors
estimates that possibly over 425,000 brownfields sites exist throughout the United States. See
U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT: REUSE OF URBAN INDUSTRIAL SITES 3 (June
1995).
States are in different stages of responding to the call for paying additional attention to
these sites. Approximately 30 states have adopted or are considering voluntary cleanup
programs to address brownfields sites. See Timothy G. Rogers, Brownfields: The Benefits and
Risks of Redevelopment of Contaminated Property, ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY, Feb. 1997, at
4-5.
40 See U.S. CONF. OF MAYORS, supra note 47, at 1-8.
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and the local tax base, provide no employment to residents, and
visually blight a community.""
Compounding the negative fallout associated with developers'
decisions not to redevelop brownfields is the impact on green-
fields-relatively pristine properties to which developers sometimes
turn as an alternative to redeveloping brownfields. Quoting the
DEC's Mr. Sullivan once again:
The inability to reuse these brownfield sites leads to develop-
ment pressure on pristine sites, "greenfield sites," in rural
and suburban areas. The resulting suburban commer-
cial/industrial sprawl results in costly local infrastructure
construction, higher local taxes, and loss of precious open
space and wildlife habitat. At the same time, our
cities-which already have existing infrastruc-
ture-deteriorate.5'
While not all observers are convinced that environmental is-
sues-most notably issues concerning the existence of contamination
or possible contamination-are a material factor contributing to the
brownfields/greenfields phenomenon outlined above,5 2 it seems clear
that the drafters of the 1996 Bond Act were convinced such a link
exists. The Governor's August 1, 1996 press release, for example,
states that "[c]ities around the state are suffering from chronic
disinvestment, often caused by the prevalence of contaminated
properties."53 A desire to create incentives for remediation of such
sites, on the theory that such incentives would lead to properties
being returned to productive use, thereby creating new jobs and
other benefits, was an animating force for the creation of the $200
million "environmental restoration" fund in Title 5.54
Subpart A of this Section identifies the real estate properties
potentially eligible for funding under the 1996 Bond Act's environ-
mental restoration program.55  Subpart B summarizes the
50 Charles E. Sullivan, Jr., The Department of Environmental Conservation's Voluntary
Remedial Program, 8 ENVTL. L. N.Y. 7, 24 (1997) [hereinafter Remedial Program].
5' Id. at 24.
52 See Anne Rabe, Brownfields: Compromised Cleanups?, ALB. L. ENVTL. OUTLOOK,
Summer/Fall 1996, at 37-43 (suggesting that other factors may play a more significant role in
impeding redevelopment of industrial properties); Berger, supra note 43, at 12.
5' Governor Pataki Signs Clean Water, Clean Air Bond Act, supra note 8, at 6.
The perception that allowing industrial properties to lie fallow contributes to a wide
variety of societal ills has led some to consider fundamental changes to the two major features
of Superfund, notably its liability scheme and its approach to cleanup standards. See Letter
from the U.S. Conference of Mayors to President Clinton, supra note 46, at app.
" See infra notes 58-80 and accompanying text.
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mechanics of the program-the process, the 1996 Bond Act. es-
tablishes for parcelling out funds-and then examines its substantive
elements.56 Subpart C seeks to put Title 5 in context by comparing
it to the approaches embodied in the two other major prongs of the
state's program for remediating properties contaminated with
hazardous wastes, the state's Title 13 Inactive Hazardous Waste
Disposal Site Remedial program and its Voluntary Cleanup Program
(VCP). 57
A. Sites Eligible for Funding Under the 1996 Bond Act's Environ-
mental Restoration Program
The 1996 Bond Act contains two threshold criteria for determining
whether remediation of real property potentially may be funded
under the Title 5 environmental restoration program. The first
criterion deals with the identity of the site owner. By limiting
eligibility for funding to environmental restoration projects, which
the 1996 Bond Act defines as "project[s] to investigate or to
remediate hazardous substances located on real property held in title
by a municipality,'"5 1 the 1996 Bond Act authorizes the expenditure
'6 See infra notes 81-130 and accompanying text.
'7 See infra notes 131-87 and accompanying text. The Title 13 program is contained in ECL
§§ 27-1301 to 27-1321 (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1997). The Voluntary Cleanup Program (VCP)
is a program whose creation former New York Governor Mario Cuomo announced in an
October 19, 1994 press release. See N.Y. EXECUTIVE CHAMBER PRESS RELEASE (Oct. 19, 1994)
[hereinafter PRESS RELEASE (Oct. 19, 1994)]. The DEC issued an Organization and Delegation
Memorandum initiating this program in December 1994. See N.Y. DEP'T ENVTL. CONSER-
VATION, ORGANIZATION AND DELEGATION MEMORANDUM NO. 94-32 (Dec. 1994) [hereinafter
MEMO # 94-32]. The DEC has cited both Title 13 and the Department's overarching authority
in ECL § 3-0301 as statutory authority for the VCP. See N.Y. Dep't of Envtl. Conservation,
Model Voluntary Cleanup Program Agreement, at 1 (attached to MEMO # 94-32). In his press
release, former Governor Cuomo indicated that he had "directed Commissioner Marsh to
develop legislation to enhance this administrative program." PRESS RELEASE (Oct. 19, 1994),
supra, at 1. DEC cleanup programs not covered in this Article include the oil spill response
program under the Navigation Law and DEC's cleanup authorities under the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act [hereinafter RCRA]. See ECL §§ 27-0900 to 27-0925 (McKinney
1984 & Supp. 1997).
58 ECL § 56-0101(7) (McKinney Supp. 1997) (emphasis added). Title 5 defines municipality
as follows:
For purposes of this title "municipality" shall have the same meaning as provided in
subdivision twelve [sic] of section 56-0101 of this article, except that such term shall not
refer to a municipality that generated, transported or disposed of, arranged for, or that
caused the generation, transportation or disposal of hazardous substance located at real
property proposed to be investigated or to be remediated under an environmental res-
toration project.
Id. § 56-0502.
Subdivision 15 of section 56-0101 defines a municipality as follows:
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of environmental restoration funds solely for municipally-owned
properties.59
The second threshold criterion for 1996 Bond Act environmental
restoration project funding relates to site conditions rather than to
identity of ownership.6 ° Section 56-0505(2) bars use of 1996 Bond
Act funds at sites the DEC has determined contain hazardous wastes
that present a significant threat to human health or the environ-
ment.6' This section prohibits the DEC from contracting for
projects for "site[s] listed [as Class 1 or 2] in the registry of inactive
hazardous waste sites under section 27-1305. "62 Class 1 and 2 sites
are the most dangerous sites On the DEC's registry; by definition,
they require cleanup in order to protect the public health or the
environment.63 Thus, only municipally-owned sites that do not pose
a significant threat to human health or the environment due to the
presence of hazardous waste are potentially eligible for 1996 Bond
Act funding.64
[A] local public authority or public benefit corporation, a county, city, town, village, school
district, supervisory district, district corporation, improvement district within a county,
city, town or village, or Indian nation or tribe recognized by the state or the United States
with a reservation wholly or partly within the boundaries of New York state, or any com-
bination thereof. In the case of aquatic habitat restoration projects, the term municipality
shall include the state.
Id. § 56-0101(15).
'9 See id. § 56-0503(2).
'0 See id. § 56-0505.
61 See id. § 56-0505(2).
Id.; see also id. § 27-1305(4)(b)(1)-(2) (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1997) (listing the
classifications relating to each site's relative priority).
" A class "1" site is one which "is causing, or presents an imminent danger of causing,
either irreversible or irreparable damage to the environment." NYCCRR tit. 6, § 375-
1.8(2)(i)(b) (1996) [hereinafter NYCRR]. A class "2" site "constitutes a significant threat to the
environment." Id. § 375-1.8(2)(ii).
' As noted elsewhere, many municipally-owned sites that pose a significant threat because
of the presence of hazardous waste are eligible for 75% state funding under the 1986
Environmental Bond Act. See ECL §§ 27-1313, 52-0303 (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1997), 56-
0505(2) (McKinney Supp. 1997). Hazardous substances sites presenting a significant threat
appear to be eligible for 1996 Bond Act funding. See id. § 56-0505(2) (prohibiting the use of
1996 Bond Act funds for remediating hazardous waste sites, but not for hazardous substance
sites). A 1995 report from the DEC and the Department of Health (DOH) found 26 hazardous
substances waste disposal sites which present a significant threat but do not qualify for
attention under Title 13 because they contain hazardous substances but not hazardous wastes.
See N.Y. DEP'T ENVTL. CONSERVATION & N.Y. DEPT HEALTH HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES WASTE
DISPOSAL TASK FORCE, REPORT ON HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCE WASTE DISPOSAL SITE
STUDY-FINAL REPORT 2, 3, 20 (June 1995) [hereinafter HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCE REPORT]. As
the DEC has noted, "[the definition of a hazardous substance ... is broader than that for
hazardous waste and encompasses hazardous waste." Id. at 3. The report also indicated that
between 135 and 192 additional hazardous substances sites 'could likely pose a significant
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The legislative history for the 1996 Bond Act is sparse, but the
reasons for these limitations on the types of properties potentially
eligible for 1996 Bond Act funding appear to be relatively straightfor-
ward.6 5  The restriction that only municipally-owned sites are
eligible for such funding likely stems, in part, from a concern that
otherwise, the 1996 Bond Act could potentially run afoul of the New
York State Constitution's bar against the government funding a
private activity.6" The 1996 Bond Act probably excludes sites that
are eligible for cleanup under Title 13 because Title 13 already
provides for state funding for remediation of municipally-owned sites
that fall into this category.67 As a result, the 1996 Bond Act's
drafters likely felt that it was not necessary to include such sites
under the 1996 Bond Act, and that it might create unnecessary
overlap to do so.6
In addition to these threshold criteria, the 1996 Bond Act lists four
criteria for prioritizing among eligible projects: (1) "the benefit to the
environment realized by the expeditious remediation of the proper-
ty;"69 (2) "the economic benefit to the state by the expeditious
remediation;"7 ° (3) "the potential opportunity of the property
proposed to be subject to such project to be used for public
recreational purposes;"7 and (4) "the opportunity for other funding
threat." Id. at 20. Furthermore, the DEC has not evaluated some contaminated properties
because the Department believes that such properties are being "actively managed by another
[DEC] Division or Agency." Id. at 10. Sites which contain hazardous substances because of
the "intended use" of such substances, not through waste disposal, were not considered (e.g.,
orchards containing pesticides). See id. at 12. In its 1994 amendments to Title 13, the State
Legislature directed the DEC and DOH to conduct this study. See ECL § 27-1316(s)
(McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1997). Part 371 of title 6 NYCRR defines "hazardous wastes," while
Part 597 defines "hazardous substances." See NYCRR tit. 6, §§ 371.1 & 597.1 (1995).
65 See PROGRAM BILL # 129R & 130R, supra note 11, at 3 (opining that the 1996 Bond Act
allocates money "to municipalities for cleanup of abandoned industrial sites").
66 See N.Y. CONST. art. VII, § 8 ("The money of the state shall not be given... in aid of any
private ... undertaking.").
'7 See ECL § 27-1313(5)(g) (McKinney Supp. 1997). See generally NYCRR tit. 6, § 375-3.1
(1995) (describing state funding for municipal hazardous waste remediation). Title 13 provides
for a 75% state contribution to municipally-owned or operated sites that are Class 1 or 2 sites.
See ECL § 27-1313(5)(g).
68 The "law of unintended consequences" may be at work here if, as some fear, Title 13 funds
are depleted in the near term. Exhaustion of the Title 13 funds would impair the DEC's ability
to clean up municipally-owned sites that present a significant threat, while the DEC
simultaneously would be relatively flush with funds to address properties that pose less
concern. See infra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
69 ECL § 56-0505(1)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1997).
'0 Id. § 56-0505(1)(b).
"' Id. § 56-0505(1)(c).
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sources to be available for the remediation."72 The 1996 Bond Act
states explicitly that, as might be expected, sites which are not likely
to be remediated without 1996 Bond Act funding should receive
higher priority for such funding than other sites."3 While the 1996
Bond Act does not offer similar explicit direction concerning the other
three criteria listed above, it seems likely that the DEC will rank
projects that promise relatively greater environmental, economic and
recreational benefit higher on the queue for 1996 Bond Act funding
than sites that appear to rank lower under these criteria.4
In sum, the 1996 Bond Act's environmental restoration program is
targeted at sites that are municipally-owned, that will not be
addressed under the traditional Title 13 cleanup program, and whose
cleanup with 1996 Bond Act financial support will produce the
greatest environmental, economic or recreational benefit. Defining
the universe of potentially eligible sites in this way is sensible in
several respects. Establishing a clear line between the 1996 Bond
Act program and the traditional Title 13 program will minimize
confusion for municipal site owners and the DEC staff about the
identity of the state remediation program for which properties
qualify, thereby minimizing time spent wrestling with such issues.
The priorities for establishing the queue of eligible sites seem
sensibly drawn to encourage the most effective use possible of 1996
Bond Act funds.
Several potential "downsides" stemming from the 1996 Bond Act
criteria deserve to be "flagged." The general nature of the criteria
may present the DEC with a difficult challenge in performing the
politically-charged task of dispensing funds and rejecting some
municipal applicants, if there prove to be more eligible sites than the
1996 Bond Act is able to address. DEC's early promulgation of
regulations containing the "rules of the game" (procedural and
substantive) for obtaining state monies could at least help to
ameliorate this concern. A second point is that DEC may not
necessarily possess specific expertise related to some of these criteria
(e.g., determinations of the relative economic benefit to be produced
by remediation of various properties). The Department will need to
72 Id. § 56-0505(1)(d).
' See id.
' The DEC has announced that it "is developing a 'priority ranking system' to determine
which projects have the greatest potential of meeting the criteria." N.Y. DEP'T ENVTL.
CONSERVATION, 1996 CLEAN WATER/CLEAN AIR BOND ACT DRAFT CRITERIA DEVELOPMENT
INFORMATION 12 (1996).
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decide whether to create such expertise in-house, or to obtain such
expertise through relationships with other agencies (or other parties).
At least three potential drawbacks that stem from the relatively
confined jurisdiction of the 1996 Bond Act's environmental res-
toration program warrant mention. The drafters' decision to render
Class 1 and 2 sites ineligible for funding potentially could have the
paradoxical environmental protection result of providing state funds
for the clean up of sites that pose relatively insignificant risks while
sites that pose far greater threats go unaddressed. The DEC, the
State Superfund Management Board and some members of the
environmental community have suggested that the funding allotted
for the Title 13 program is running out, with considerable cleanup
work still remaining to be done.75
It is not clear whether new legislation will, in fact, be forthcoming
in the near future to address this apparent shortfall in funding for
7 Although the agency's thinking on the exact time frame has shifted, the DEC has reported
on numerous occasions that New York's Superfund will be exhausted within the next couple
of years, leaving a substantial number of sites still requiring and awaiting cleanup. See, e.g.,
Key Lawmaker Charges Superfund 'Sold Out, Pataki Environmentalists Cut Bond Deal That
Excludes Superfund, INSIDE EPA's SUPERFUND REP., Sept. 18, 1996, at 7 [hereinafter Key
Lawmaker Charges Superfund 'Sold Out'] (discussing the DEC's announcement that funding
for the Superfund Program will be exhausted in the near future). The State Board charged
with overseeing the State Superfund program, the State Superfund Management Board,
created by ECL § 27-1319 (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1997), has reached the same conclusion.
See STATE SUPERFUND MGMT. BD., 11TH ANNUAL EVALUATION: NEW YORK STATE HAZARDOUS
WASTE SITE REMEDIATION PROGRAM 3 (Jan. 1, 1997) [hereinafter 11TH ANNUAL EVALUATION]
(indicating that the Board now anticipates that "EQBA funding will be fully committed by the
third quarter of the 1998/99 State Fiscal Year"). In addition, the Board notes that the state
"is now confronted with an estimated current shortfall of $1.5-$1.8 billion to complete the
remedial program. There are insufficient funds to remediate all the known sites, let alone any
new sites that will be discovered in the next few years." Id. at 5. See also BARRIERS &
INCENTIVES, supra note 42, at 14 (stating that "[bly all accounts, the task of remediating the
Registry sites threatens to overwhelm the resources allocated for this purpose," and noting that
in 1993, the DEC anticipated that it would have sufficient funds to clean up only 480 of the
760 Class 2 sites requiring remediation and that the DEC estimated that it would require an
additional $1.6 billion to remediate all 760 sites identified at that time). Anne Rabe, Executive
Director of the Citizens' Environmental Coalition, is cited as having reservations about the
1996 Bond Act because 'i]t doesn't address the problem of toxic waste dumps in New York
or the ailing Superfund program, which is about to go bankrupt."' Elsa Brenner, Environmen-
tal Bill: The Pros and Cons, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 1996, at 13WC-11.
The failure to have the 1996 Bond Act replenish the Superfund is said to have caused
controversy among environmental groups when those groups considered whether to endorse
the 1996 Bond Act. Some groups supported the 1996 Bond Act only on Governor Pataki's
promise that he would address the issue of Superfund through a funding proposal that was due
in November, 1996. See Key Lawmaker Charges Superfund 'Sold Out,' supra, at 7; Environ-
mentalists May Drop Support for Bonds Without Superfund Plan, INSIDE EPA'S SUPERFUND
REP., Oct. 2, 1996, at 17.
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remediation of Title 13 sites. One report indicates that industry is
likely to vigorously contest steps to accumulate the necessary funds
through increased taxation and fees.76 Intuitively, the November
1996 enactment of a $1.75 billion Environmental Bond Act will likely
complicate efforts to replenish the State Superfund, regardless of the
need for an infusion of funds.7
In sum, at least a possibility exists that exhaustion of Title 13
monies for "significant threat" sites will leave the state in the
unenviable position of being unable to fund remediation of sites that
pose a truly substantial threat to the environment and the people
living nearby, while being relatively awash with funds to address
sites that pale in comparison in terms of environmental threat. This
outcome would be directly contrary to the theme that permeates
much of the discussion today about future directions of environmen-
tal policy-notably, that we should be prioritizing among problems
and pursuing the worst risks first.
7 1
7 See Supeifund Financing Takes Center Stage in New York Environmental Debate, INSIDE
EPA's SUPERFUND REP., Mar. 6, 1996, at 19 (reporting that "[ilndustry groups ... dismiss any
additional industry-based fees as economically detrimental").
7" The State Superfund Management Board noted that bonding, in particular, was less likely
to be available to replenish these funds. See 11TH ANNUAL EVALUATION, supra note 75, at 8.
One reviewer of an early draft of this Article disagreed with the assertion in the text. She
suggested that the 1996 Bond Act might enhance prospects for replenishing the Superfund by
focusing greater attention on the need for cleanups of contaminated sites.
7 See, e.g., U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, SAB-EC-90-021, REDUCING RISK: SETTING
PRIORITIES AND STRATEGIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 1 (1990) (maintaining that
environmental protection efforts should "assess the range of environmental problems of concern
and then target protective efforts at the problems that seem to be the most serious"); Markell,
States as Innovators, supra note 20, at 366 (discussing efforts to "prioritize among environmen-
tal concerns and address such concerns comprehensively"). Justifications other than enhanced
environmental protection, of course, have been offered to support investing funds in
remediating brownfields. See GUIDELINES, supra note 20, at 1-2 (discussing restoring economic
vitality to brownfield areas as one such justification); Berger, supra note 43, at 1, 13 (providing
economic relief to municipalities that acquire brownfields through tax foreclosure).
In its report on sites containing hazardous substances, the DEC projected that the state's
share of cleanup costs at sites posing a significant threat, but not containing hazardous wastes,
would be in the range of $342-$432 million. See HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCE REPORT, supra note
64, at 20. Spending the $200 million in environmental restoration funds available through the
1996 Bond Act on these sites seemingly would ameliorate this concern.
In its 1991 effort to rank risks, EPA Region 2, which covers New York State, ranked
Superfund sites, active RCRA sites, and municipal solid waste sites from a series of
perspectives, including human health (cancer and non-cancer), ecological effects, and
economics/welfare effects. See U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY REGION 2, RISK RANKING
PROJECT REGION 2: COMPARATIVE RISK RANKING OF THE HEALTH, ECOLOGICAL, AND WELFARE
EFFECTS OF TWENTY-SEVEN ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEM AREAS: OVERVIEW REPORT 8 (June
i991). Risks for different sites varied by category. For example, the Region ranked Superfund
and RCRA sites as "very high" in terms of non-cancer health effects, and ranked municipal
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The decision of the drafters of the 1996 Bond Act to limit eligible
sites to those owned by municipalities raises at least two potential
sets of issues. First, it almost certainly will cause the transfer of
some properties from private to municipal ownership in order to
make them eligible for state cleanup-related funding. These
transfers to municipal ownership, which would not occur absent the
1996 Bond Act, may raise a series of issues.79 A second possible
downside is that certain properties which would otherwise place high
up on the list for funding based on the 1996 Bond Act's four criteria
(i.e., remediation would produce significant positive economic,
environmental or recreational benefits and likely would not occur
otherwise) will not qualify because they are not municipally-
owned.80 This outcome, again, would be contrary to the notion that
we should be targeting our efforts and resources to the problems
solid waste sites as "medium." See id. at 26. The combined ranking was "high" for the
Superfund and RCRA sites, and medium for municipal solid waste sites. See id. at 40.
" Among other possibilities, these transfers may burden local taxpayers under various
scenarios. For example, in acquiring a property a municipality would potentially be subject
to common law and/or statutory liability due to its status as the owner for contamination
present on the property or migrating from it. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(20)(D), 9607(a)(1)
(1994); ECL § 27-1313(5)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1997). It appears that the 1996 Bond Act process
requires a municipality to take title to property (and subject itself to these potential liabilities)
without enabling the municipality simultaneously to receive the major "carrots" for
participation-i.e., a guarantee of state funding of up to 75% of the investigation and
remediation costs, and a release from state liability and indemnification from common law
liability. Among other features, the DEC appears to contemplate that municipalities that
receive a grant to investigate a site may later have their applications for funding to remediate
the site rejected. See, e.g., N.Y. DEP'T ENVTL. CONSERVATION, DRAFT TECHNICAL AD-
MINISTRATIVE GUIDANCE MEMORANDUM (TAGM) AND ASSOCIATED DOCUMENTS-BROWNFIELDS
PROGRAM, CLEAN WATER/CLEAN AIR BOND ACT OF 1996 ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION
PROJECTS BROWNFIELDS PROGRAM: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 2 (undated) [hereinafter TAGM
AND ASSOCIATED DOCUMENTS] (stating that "there is no guarantee that a grant will be
approved for remediation of the same site [for which an investigation grant has been approved
and provided]"). The structure of the release contained in the 1996 Bond Act appears to limit
this concern to some extent. Section 56-0509(1)(a) makes the release effective upon compliance
with the terms of a state assistance contract involving performance of an "environmental
restoration project." ECL § 56-0509(1)(a)(i) (McKinney Supp. 1997). Either an investigative
study or a remedial project appears to qualify as an "environmental restoration project" (the
1996 Bond Act does not include a definition of the term in its definition section, but this seems
a reasonable reading of the Title as a whole and it was the reading provided by the DEC staff
during a meeting of the Environmental Enforcement Advisory Committee on March 20, 1997
attended by the author). As a result, a municipality may receive a release from liability upon
completion of an investigative study under a state assistance contract. Presumably, the cost
of such a study typically will be fairly nominal, especially compared to the cost of remediation.
Further limiting the scope of the municipality's exposure is the state's contribution of up to
75% of the cost of the investigation. See ECL § 56-0503(1).
80 See ECL § 56-0505(1)(a)-(d) (listing the four criteria that determine eligibility for state
assistance).
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posing the greatest risks or providing the "greatest return" on our
investment.
B. Procedural and Substantive Requirements for Obtaining
Funding Under Title 5 of the 1996 Bond Act 8
1. Procedural Requirements
The 1996 Bond Act makes the state's environmental regulatory
agency, the DEC, the gatekeeper for approving participation in the
environmental restoration program and the dispenser of 1996 Bond
Act funds.82 As might be expected, given that only municipally-
owned sites are eligible for state funding under the 1996 Bond Act,
only municipalities may receive funds under the 1996 Bond Act.83
The 1996 Bond Act imposes several obligations on a municipality
interested in securing state financial support for an environmental
restoration project.84
A municipality must enter into a formal, enforceable contract with
the DEC, in which the DEC may commit to pay up to seventy-five
percent of the cost of the project.85 The municipality must make a
series of commitments to obtain such funds.86 It must commit to
undertake the needed work at the site; to "proceed expeditiously";
and to involve the public in developing plans to remediate the
81 The DEC has issued a series of draft guidance documents that provide additional
information on the process for applying for funding for Title 5 and the contents of the program.
See Memorandum from Michael J. O'Toole, Jr., Director, Division of Envtl. Remediation, N.Y.
Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, to Regional HWRE/SE (undated) (on file with the Albany Law
Review). The draft guidance documents include an application form, a Procedures Handbook,
a municipal resolution, and a state assistance contract. See id.
82 See id.
83 See ECL § 56-0503(1).
8' See id. § 56-0503(2)(e)-(i).
'5 See id. § 56-0503(1). This 75% state contribution toward municipal site remediation is
not unique to the 1996 Bond Act. The 1986 EQBA authorizes the DEC to reimburse
municipalities for up to 75% of their costs for municipally-owned or operated Class 1 or 2
inactive hazardous waste disposal sites. See id. § 27-1313(5)(g) (McKinney Supp. 1997);
NYCRR tit. 6, § 375-3.1(a)(4) (1995). A recent article indicates that New Jersey adopted a law
in November 1996 that would enable developers which remediate certain sites to be
reimbursed by the state for up to 75% of their costs. See New Jersey Law to Reimburse
Developers Up to 75 Percent of Cleanup Costs, ENVTL. POLY ALERT, Dec. 4, 1996, at 14;
Municipal Landfill Site Closure, Remediation & Redevelopment Act of 1996, 1996 N.J. Laws
124.
86 See ECL § 56-0503(2)(e)-(f) (McKinney Supp. 1997).
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property.8 7 With respect to the public's role, the municipality must,
at a minimum, provide a forty-five day period for submission of
written comments on the draft remedial plan and hold a public
hearing if the "affected community" raises "substantive issues"
concerning the draft plan.8" The municipality must provide "tec-
hnical assistance if so requested by members of the affected
community."89
2. Substantive Ground Rules
The 1996 Bond Act establishes basic substantive ground rules to
govern environmental restoration projects as well. The two main
ground rules fall under the general concepts of cleanup standards
and liability.
a. Cleanup Standards
The DEC's approach to the issue of "how clean is clean" is likely
to be of central importance in the ultimate success or failure of the
8 See id. Another issue involves a municipality's obligation to reimburse the state. This
issue may arise in at least two contexts. First, it arises in the context of the nature of a
municipality's obligation to recover funds from the parties responsible for the contamination.
See TAGM AND ASSOCIATED DOCUMENTS, supra note 79, at 3. One difference between the 1996
Bond Act and Title 13 in this area is that Title 13 requires municipalities that receive state
funding to make all reasonable efforts to recover government expenditures from responsible
parties, while the 1996 Bond Act does not include such a requirement. Compare NYCRR tit.
6, § 375-3.2 (1995) (requiring the municipality to identify responsible parties and seek payment
from them) with TAGM AND ASSOCIATED DOCUMENTS, supra note 79, at 3 (noting that a
municipality "would not be required" to recover state costs but "may be asked to assist the
State in such recovery by providing information gathered as a result of the project").
Second, it arises in connection with a municipality's obligations if it sells or leases the
property. See TAGM AND ASSOCIATED DOCUMENTS, supra note 79, at 3; ECL § 56-0503(2)(c)-
(d). The DEC has attempted to provide some additional information on the nature of a
municipality's obligation to share with the DEC the proceeds of the municipality's sale or
leasing of the site. See TAGM AND ASSOCIATED DOCUMENTS, supra note 79, at 3. Under some
circumstances, state funding appears to create a form of state equity in the property. See ECL
§ 56-0503(2)(d) (requiring, for example, that a municipality give to the state 50% of the
proceeds from the sale of property, once certain costs are reimbursed).
"R ECL § 56-0503(2)(f). The 1996 Bond Act does not provide guidance on the details of such
assistance (e.g., the level of assistance, who qualifies, the number of parties who may qualify,
etc.). Cf. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9617 (1994) (discussing public participation in a federal
remedial action plan); National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, 40
C.F.R. § 300.155 (1996) (discussing community relations requirements under CERCLA);
NYCRR tit. 6, § 375-1.5 (1995) (detailing the DEC's citizen participation requirements under
the inactive hazardous waste disposal site program).
'9 ECL § 56-0503(2)(f).
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Title 5 environmental restoration program.9° This issue has proved
vexing in other cleanup programs at both the federal and state
levels.9 At least three possible answers to the "level of cleanup"
issue are possible. First, there is the notion of returning a property
to pre-release conditions.92 In many situations, this will be the
most stringent approach.9 Second, there is the idea that a site
should be cleaned up so that it may be used for any purpose.94
Because concentrations are lowest for residential property use,
adoption of this approach often will mean that a site will be cleaned
up in order that it may be used for residential purposes.95 Finally,
there is the concept that a site should be cleaned up for industrial or
commercial use; cleanup standards for these uses typically are
relatively relaxed.96
0 This issue was one of the most contentious during the negotiations over the terms of the
1996 Bond Act. See 'Brown fields' Provision of Bond Act Coming Under Fire, GLENS FALLS POST
STAR (N.Y.), June 20, 1996, at B9 (indicating that the 1996 Bond Act "provisions attracting the
most fire concern so-called brownfields rehabilitations ... [and that] several environmentalists
said [Governor] Pataki's proposal would create lower cleanup standards [than are used] under
the state's Superfund program").
"' For an overview of the issue of cleanup standards at the federal level, see John
Pendergrass, Use of Institutional Controls as Part of a Superfund Remedy: Lessons From Other
Programs, 26 ENVTL. L. REP. 10109 (1996). See also ORIN KRAMER & RICHARD BRIFFAULT,
CLEANING UP HAZARDOUS WASTE: Is THERE A BETTER WAY? 25-27 (1993) (discussing various
cleanup standards and the costs involved); Markell, Federal Superfund, supra note 20, at 14-15
(discussing the controversy over "how clean is clean" in relation to the reauthorization of
CERCLA).
At least some degree of consensus seems to have emerged concerning the issue of type of
cleanup-the view that permanent remedies that actually destroy the waste are to be preferred
over containment remedies that isolate the waste appears to have won out, although to some
degree the increasing popularity of institutional and engineering controls represents a move
in the opposite direction. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 9621(b) (1994) (maintaining that remedial
actions that permanently reduce pollutants are the preferred treatment); NYCRR tit. 6, § 375-
1.10(c)(5) (1995) (ranking remedial technologies from most to least preferred); ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW & REGULATION IN NEW YORK § 9.23.6 (William R. Ginsberg & Philip Weinberg eds., 1996)
[hereinafter Ginsberg] (discussing a preference for permanent solutions in New York's
regulation of the cleanup of waste).
. See NYCRR tit. 6, § 375-1.10(b) (1995) (stating that restoring a site to pre-disposal
condition is the goal of the program).
9 See Casey Scott Padgett, Selecting Remedies at Superfund Sites: How Should "Clean" Be
Determined?, 18 VT. L. REV. 361, 368 (1994) (noting that returning property to its pre-release
condition tends to be far more costly than containment or control).
4 See id. at 399 (suggesting that CERCLA currently assumes "unrestricted" future use).
9' See U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE AND ENERGY RESPONSE,
LAND USE IN THE CERCLA REMEDY SELECTION PROCESS, DIR. No. 9355.7-04, at 3, 7 (1995)
(noting that residential use poses the greatest potential for human exposure).
. See id. at 7 (noting that industrial use standards allow higher levels of contaminants to
remain in the soil after cleanup).
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The 1996 Bond Act's coverage of the cleanup standards issue is
quite brief. The 1996 Bond Act simply adopts the cleanup standards
approach that the DEC already applies in its inactive hazardous
waste disposal site program under Article 27, Title 13 of the
Environmental Conservation Law. The 1996 Bond Act provides that
"[t]he remediation objective of an environmental restoration project
shall meet the same standard for protection of public health and the
environment that applies to remedial actions undertaken pursuant
to section 27-1313 of this chapter."97 This brief reference to section
27-1313 is not likely to resolve the issue of cleanup standards. As an
article on the Federal Superfund program put it, this is "[o]ne of the
most contentious issues surrounding the reauthorization of Super-
fund" and Title 13 has by no means put this issue to rest.9" Two
commentators have anticipated that confusion will be created by the
1996 Bond Act's language, noting that "[u]nder the Bond Act, sites
must be cleaned to the level set forth in ... [Title 13], regardless of
intended future use. While the DEC may believe it has the authority
to impose risk-based remediation standards upon cleanups conducted
under the Bond Act, this provision implies otherwise."9
A second source of possible controversy concerning cleanup
standards is that the Title 13 standards that are intended to apply
to 1996 Bond Act sites were crafted for sites that present a "sig-
nificant threat" to the environment.' 0 The obvious query for 1996
Bond Act sites will be how much cleanup is needed, particularly for
the 1996 Bond Act sites where concentrations of wastes do not rise
9' ECL § 56-0505(3) (McKinney Supp. 1997).
"8 Different Standards for Industrial Use? ENVTL. FORUM, Nov.-Dec. 1993, at 34 (involving
a four person debate on different cleanup standards for industrial use). For a summary of
criticisms of New York's approach to cleanup standards, see BARRIERS & INCENTIVES, supra
note 42, at 15. The DEC Part 375 regulations establish a goal of cleanup to pre-release con-
ditions, but also contemplate that cleanups that simply eliminate the significant threat posed
by a site will suffice in some cases, providing as follows:
The goal of the program for a specific site is to restore that site to pre-disposal
conditions, to the extent feasible and authorized by law. At a minimum, the remedy
selected shall eliminate or mitigate all significant threats to the public health and to the
environment presented by hazardous waste disposed at the site ....
See NYCRR tit. 6, § 375-1.10(b) (1995).
Some reviewers of an early draft of this Article disagreed with the notion that cleanup
standards under Title 13 are unclear, suggesting that the DEC has established and applied
clear cleanup levels relatively consistently through its implementation of the state Superfund
program.
" Terresa Bakner & Sara Potter, New York State Initiatives to Achieve Brownfields
Redevelopment, ALB. L. ENVTL. OUTLOOK, Summer/Fall 1996, at 5, 11 (citation omitted).
100 See ECL § 27-1313(3)(b)(i) (McKinney 1984).
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to the level of presenting a significant threat. Because many 1996
Bond Act sites are unlikely to pose a significant threat, 01 this is
not simply a theoretical question.0 2 In short, the brevity of the
1996 Bond Act's treatment of the cleanup standards issue may not
necessarily translate into clarity when it comes to determining the
level of cleanup needed for 1996 Bond Act sites.
Two issues related to cleanup standards that deserve separate
mention are the notions of institutional controls and engineering
controls, and the applicability of permitting to. the remediation
process established by Title 5. The municipality, as well as any
successors in title, and lessees will be bound to implement and
maintain any "engineering and/or institutional controls" which the
DEC deems necessary.0 3 The 1996 Bond Act specifically lists deed
restrictions as one form of institutional control and indicates that, if
such restrictions are required, the municipality shall have them
"recorded and indexed as declarations of restrictions in the office of
the recording officer of the county or counties where the real
property subject to such environmental restoration project is located
in the manner prescribed by article nine of the real property
law.",' 0
4
A final feature relating to site remediation and cleanups which
holds considerable potential benefit for the municipality is the 1996
Bond Act's exemption of the municipality and any successor in title
from state or local permits for activities that are part of the remedial
action and are conducted on the property subject to the action.' °
As is the case under the federal Superfund Law, the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
(CERCLA), and New York State's Superfund Law, contained in
Article 27, Title 13 of the Environmental Conservation Law, the 1996
Bond Act dispenses with the need to obtain a permit for remedial
1o' As noted above, hazardous waste sites that present a significant threat are not eligible
for funding under the 1996 Bond Act program. See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
Hazardous substance sites that present such a threat are eligible for cleanup under the 1996
Bond Act. See ECL § 56-0505 (McKinney Supp. 1997).
102 The DEC is currently struggling with this issue under its VCP. See infra notes 150-87
and accompanying text (discussing the DEC's VCP). In his recent article, Charles Sullivan,
Chief of the DEC's Voluntary Cleanup Program Practice Group, notes that "[the Department
is in the process of articulating a third remedial component: addressing onsite contamination
that is readily remediable but does not yet cause significant impacts." Remedial Program,
supra note 50, at 26.
103 See ECL § 56-0503(2)(g).
104 Id. § 56-0503(2)(i).
'0' See id. § 56-0503(2)(j).
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activity, but it requires compliance with the substantive re-
quirements that would be contained in such permits. °6
b. Liability
The second major issue traditionally associated with remediation
programs involves the scope of liability-essentially the question of
what types of parties fall within the liability net and the extent of
their legal exposure. The 1996 Bond Act requires the state to make
"all reasonable efforts" to recover state funds expended for environ-
mental restoration projects. 107 It requires a municipality selling a
property to a responsible party to deposit the portion of the proceeds
constituting the "state assistance provided to the
municipality ... plus accrued interest and transaction costs,"108
into the state's environmental restoration account. 09 The goal of
these provisions undoubtedly is to prevent expenditure of state
funds, notably the state assistance payments of up to 75% of project
costs, from producing a private windfall, especially to a responsible
party (e.g., a party who was involved in disposal of the hazardous
substances that were the subject of the cleanup).
No doubt because of the perception that the breadth of the Title 13
and CERCLA liability nets discourage reuse of sites, the 1996 Bond
Act casts its net of liability more narrowly."0 The 1996 Bond Act
10 See id.; see also CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9621(e) (1994); NYCRR tit. 6, § 375-1.7 (1995).
The DEC's VCP chief Sullivan discusses the role of the State Environmental Quality Review
Act (SEQRA) in his Nov. 25, 1996 memorandum. See Charles E. Sullivan, Jr., The Department
of Environmental Conservation's Voluntary Cleanup Program (Nov. 25, 1996); see also ECL § 8-
0101 to 8-0117 (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1997).
107 See ECL § 56-0507(2) (McKinney Supp. 1997).
108 Id. § 56-0505(4). A municipality retains the right to maintain ownership of the property
and use it for "public purposes." See id. It is not clear whether the phrase "public purposes"
is intended to limit a municipality's ability to use such property. The legislative history is
silent on the question.
109 See id. The 1996 Bond Act indicates that if a municipality disposes of property before
the DEC is satisfied that the project's remediation objective has been attained, the
municipality "shall be liable to ensure that such objective is attained within the time called for
in the state assistance contract." Id. § 56-0505(5).
10 See CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1994); ECL § 27-1313(4) (McKinney 1984); NYCRR
tit. 6, § 375-1.3(u) (1995). Congress's approach to liability, and EPA's strategy in this area,
continues to evolve. See, e.g., Asset Conservation, Lender Liability and Deposit Insurance
Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 2501-02, 110 Stat. 3009 (amending CERCLA, 42
U.S.C. § 9620(E) and (F), to provide new statutory protection for lenders). For a summary of
the evolution of EPA's views on providing relief to prospective purchasers, see Rogers, supra
note 48, at 1-3 (comparing the EPA's 1989 and 1995 guidance documents covering prospective
purchasers). See also Guidance on Agreements with Prospective Purchasers of Contaminated
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expressly exempts four -types of parties from liability for remedial
costs: municipalities that "undertake ... environmental restoration
project[s] and comply[ ] with the terms... of the[ir] contract" with
the DEC for such a project,' and successors in title, lessees and
lenders." 2  This exemption is subject to the proviso that "such
successor in title, lessee, or lender did not generate, arrange for,
transport, or dispose, and did not cause the generation, arrangement
for, transportation, or disposal of any hazardous substance located
at such property, and did not own such property.""
13
The 1996 Bond Act's authors' presumed intention with this section
was to shield these parties from liability which they were concerned
might attach if the liability principles of CERCLA and Title 13
applied." 4 The authors nevertheless made clear that piercing of
this shield would be appropriate-i.e., the exemption from liability
for municipalities, successors in title, lenders, and lessees would not
apply-in four situations, providing as follows:
Subdivision one of this section shall not apply to relieve any
municipality, successor in title, lessee, or lender from liability
arising from:
(a) failing to implement such project to the department's
satisfaction or failing to comply with the terms and
conditions of the contract;
(b) fraudulently demonstrating that the cleanup levels
identified in or to be identified in accordance with such
project were reached;
(c) causing the release or threat of release at the property
subject to such project of any hazardous substance after
the effective date of such contract; or
Property and Model Prospective Purchaser Agreement, 60 Fed. Reg. 34792, 34794 (1995).
" ECL § 56-0509(1)(a)(i) (McKinney Supp. 1997).
11 See id. This liability exemption includes statutory or common law liability to the state
and statutory liability to "any person." See ECL § 56-0509(1)(a).
... Id. § 56-0509(1)(a)(ii); see also Bakner & Potter, supra note 99, at 7 (stating that '[the
Bond Act provides for a qualified release of municipalities and their successors in title").
"1 In the Estate of William S. Lasdon, then DEC Executive Deputy Commissioner, Langdon
Marsh, held that CERCLA case law may be applied in cases under Title 13. Executive Deputy
Commissioner Marsh noted
There are few cases that have been decided under ECL § 27-1313 or its implementing
regulations .... However, the relevant portion of their provisions relating to the
identification of "responsible parties" are virtually identical to those found in [CERCLA].
Therefore, the decisional law which interprets the CERCLA provisions may be applied
Estate of William S. Lasdon, No. W3-006-8101, 1994 N.Y. ENV LEXIS 8, at *13 (N.Y. Dep't of
Envtl. Conservation Mar. 1, 1994).
1997] 1241
Albany Law Review
(d) changing such property's use from the intended use as
identified in the contract pursuant to section 56-0503 to
a use requiring a lower level of residual contamination
unless the additional remedial activities are undertaken
which shall meet the same standard for protection of
public health and the environment that applies to
remedial actions undertaken pursuant to 27-1313 of this
chapter so that such use can be implemented with
sufficient protection of public health and the environ-
ment. 115
The 1996 Bond Act's inclusion of "reopener" conditions represents
another relatively limited fracture in the shield from liability."6
Section 56-0509(4) provides that two of the four parties, the
municipality and the successor in title (if any), are on the hook to a
limited degree if 1) conditions on the site "are not sufficiently
protective of human health for its current use," 7 and 2) the
concern is "due to environmental conditions ... unknown to the
[DEC] as of the effective date of such contract or due to information
received ... after the [DEC's] approval of such project's final
engineering report and certification.""8  In particular, the 1996
Bond Act makes the municipality and successor in title responsible
to "take such emergency measures [as] are necessary to maintain
sufficient protection of human health for such property's current use
until such conditions are addressed."119 The 1996 Bond Act char-
ges the DEC with responsibility for ultimately returning the property
to a "condition sufficiently protective of human health" in such
circumstances, thereby limiting the exposure of the municipality and
successor in title. 12
0
115 ECL § 56-0509(2)(a)-(d); see also Bakner & Potter, supra note 99, at 9 (detailing when
the Act authorizes the DEC to require further remedial activity). The 1996 Bond Act places
the burden on municipalities and successors in title, lessees, and lenders to prove that
hazardous substances were not disposed of on the property after they became involved in order
to qualify for this liability exemption, providing that "any person seeking the benefit of this
subdivision [56-0509(1)] shall bear the burden of proving that a cause of action, or any part
thereof, is attributable solely to hazardous substances present in or on such parcel before the
effective date of such contract [between the DEC and the municipality]." ECL § 56-0509(1)(b).
"' "The term 'reopener' refers to a circumstance which provides an exception to the qualified
release of liability developers receive from the State in exchange for remediating a brownfield."
Bakner & Potter, supra note 99, at 8.
17 ECL § 56-0509(4).
lie Id.
119 Id.
1. See id. This reopener is narrower than that typically provided under the DEC's Title 13
program or CERCLA. See id. § 27-1313(5)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1997); see also CERCLA, 42
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Perhaps the most remarkable provision in Title 5 of the 1996 Bond
Act is the section committing the state to indemnify these four
categories of parties under certain circumstances.' 2' The 1996
Bond Act provides these parties with a qualified release from
statutory and common law liability to the state and a similarly
qualified release from statutory liability to other persons.
12
Presumably to address the possibility of common law tort liability to
such other persons (e.g., neighbors), section 56-0509(3) provides that
the state will indemnify and defend these four categories of parties
from common law-based causes of action, as follows:
The state shall indemnify and save harmless any
municipality, successor in title, lessee, or lender indentified
[sic] in paragraph (a) of subdivision one of this section in the
amount of any judgment, or settlement, obtained against such
municipality, successor in title, lessee or lender in any court
for any common law cause of action arising out of the
presence of any hazardous substance in or on property at
anytime before the effective date of a contract entered into
pursuant to this title.
123
While the legislative history is silent, this provision reflects the 1996
Bond Act proponents' determination to take extraordinary steps to
address fears that they must have believed lenders, lessees, and
others share about potential liability associated with sites containing
hazardous substances. As is discussed in more detail in Subpart C
below, this provision, like the liability release discussed above,
represents a much different approach to promoting site cleanups
than that embodied in New York State's Title 13, addressing inactive
hazardous waste disposal sites.
124
A final issue in the 1996 Bond Act, alluded to above but which
deserves brief mention in its own right, is that of change of use. The
1996 Bond Act requires parties contemplating a "change of use" of a
property remediated under the 1996 Bond Act to provide the DEC
U.S.C. § 9622(f) (1994).
121 See ECL § 56-0509(3) (McKinney Supp. 1997). One aspect of this extraordinary provision
that may receive judicial attention at some point is whether it is consistent with the
Constitutional ban on state monies being used "in aid of any private... undertaking." N.Y.
CONST. art. VII, § 8.
122 See supra notes 111-12 and accompanying text; see also ECL § 56-0509(1)(a).
123 ECL § 56-0509(3).
" See infra notes 131-87 and accompanying text (detailing similarities and differences
among the 1996 Bond Act, Title 13, and the VCP); see also ECL §§ 27-1301 to 27-1321
(McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1997) (discussing inactive hazardous waste disposal sites).
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with advance notice of at least 60 days. 25 The law defines "change
of use" broadly to include, inter alia: (1) activities "not consistent
with restrictions placed upon the use of the property[;]" 126 (2)
activities that may "prevent or interfere significantly with a
proposed, ongoing, or completed project;"12v (3) activities that
"expose the public health or the environment to a significantly
increased threat of harm or damage at such property[;" 128 or (4)
"transfer of title to all or part of [the] property." 29 The 1996 Bond
Act empowers the DEC to provide the person giving notice with a
written determination that the proposed change of use "will not be
authorized, together with the reasons for such determination," if the
DEC Commissioner makes the judgment that the "use is prohibited
pursuant to this section."3 0 The section does not, in fact, identify
which changes of use the DEC may prohibit. It is likely that the
DEC will construe this section to empower it to prohibit changes of
use that the Department believes will: (1) jeopardize the integrity of
the remedy; (2) be inconsistent with the cleanup at the site (e.g.,
residential use at a property cleaned up to commercial levels); or (3)
otherwise pose a risk to human health or the environment.
C. Preliminary Thoughts on the 1996 Bond Act's Place Within
New York's Troika of Inactive Hazardous Waste Disposal Site
Cleanup Programs1
31
The Governor and Legislature were by no means writing on a
blank slate when they approved the 1996 Bond Act, nor were the
people of New York when they voted in favor of it. Instead, New
York has a longstanding program devoted to remediating con-
taminated inactive hazardous waste disposal sites, referred to
sometimes as the Title 13 program because it is contained in Article
121 See ECL § 56-0511(1) (McKinney Supp. 1997). Environmental Conservation Law section
27-1305(3)(b) and NYCRR tit. 6, §§ 375-1.2(f), 375-1.3(v) and 375-1.6 address "changes of use"
at sites handled under the inactive hazardous waste disposal site program. See also ECL § 27-
1305 commentary at 334-35 (McKinney Supp. 1997); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 316(b) (McKinney
Supp. 1997).
126 ECL § 56-0511(2) (McKinney Supp.'1997).
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 Id. § 56-0511(3)(i).
'30 Id. § 56-0511(2).
3 RCRA, covering hazardous waste, and the Navigation Law, covering petroleum-related
incidents, contain additional cleanup authority not covered in this section. See RCRA, 42
U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1994); ECL §§ 27-0900 to 27-0920 (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1997); N.Y.
NAV. LAw §§ 170-197 (McKinney 1989 & Supp. 1997).
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27, Title 13 of the state's Environmental Conservation Law. 132
Further, in 1994, following a course, pursued by. many states
nationwide, New York created a "Voluntary Cleanup Program."133
As suggested above, presumably the Legislature and Governor were
mindful of the existence and nature of these programs when they
structured the 1996 Bond Act environmental restoration program.
This section traces some of the more significant similarities and
differences among Title 5 of the 1996 Bond Act, Title 13, and the
VCP in terms of three key elements: (1) the universe of sites covered;
(2) cleanup standards; and (3) scope of liability.'3 4
1. A Summary of the Title 13 Program 35
Title 13 jurisdiction to clean up contaminated sites has been
confined over the years to sites containing hazardous wastes that
'3 See ECL §§ 27-1301 to 27-1321 (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1997). New York's law was
adopted in 1979, preceding the federal Superfund statute, CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675
(1994).
133 See MEMO # 94-32, supra note '57. In testimony the author provided in a hearing
sponsored by the State Legislative Commission on Toxic Substances and Hazardous Wastes,
he raised the issue of how best to structure the state's environmental remediation laws to
maximize their effectiveness, including whether a separate voluntary cleanup law was needed.
See Statement of David L. Markell, Assistant Professor, Albany Law School Before the
Legislative Commission on Toxic Substances and Hazardous Wastes on Voluntary Environmen-
tal Cleanup and Economic Development: What Should Be Done for New York? 5 (Nov. 21,
1994).
134 Because this Article focuses on state-administered programs, it does not cover CERCLA
or EPA's evolving "brownfields"-related efforts, even though these programs also relate to
contaminated sites. See CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §8 9601-9675; GUIDELINES, supra note 20, at 2.
As some commentators have observed, individuals interested in developing a comprehensive
understanding of the state's remedial efforts must become familiar with these programs as
well. See, e.g., Ginsberg, supra note 91, § 9.15 ("Title 13 ... has always been [ I used by New
York only as an adjunct to CERCLA in the state's efforts to remediate its most significant
inactive hazardous waste disposal sites. . . ."); see also ENVTL. POLY ALERT 11 (Mar. 12, 1997)
(discussing the EPA's interaction with state voluntary cleanup programs). This Article also
does not cover the oil spill response program administered by the DEC under the Navigation
Law. See N.Y. NAy. LAW §§ 170-197 (McKinney 1989 & Supp. 1997) (regulating oil spill
prevention, control and compensation). In addition to the three elements listed in the text, the
discussion of DEC's VCP program also addresses the issue of citizen participation under the
various programs. See infra notes 183-87 and accompanying text.
13' For a more complete discussion of Title 13, see Ginsberg, supra note 91, §§ 9.15-9.33;
David L. Markell & Dolores A. Tuohy, Some Thoughts on Running a Superfund Enforcement
Program: A State Perspective, NAT'L ENvTL. ENFORCEMENT J. 3 (Nov. 1990); see also
HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCE REPORT, supra note 64 (containing an overview of the Title 13
program, as well as a collection of legislative history and other relevant documents).
For a summary of listed sites and the status of the remedial action at those sites, see N.Y.
DEP'T ENVTL. CONSERVATION, REMEDIAL ACTION REPORT (July 1996).
1246 Albany Law Review [Vol. 60
present a significant threat to the environment.' Of the three
types of unremediated sites that the DEC places on its Title 13
registry of inactive hazardous waste disposal sites, only Class 1 and
Class 2 sites qualify for cleanup."3 7 Class 1 sites present "an
imminent danger" and require "immediate action." 8' Class 2 sites
pose a "[slignificant threat to the public health or environment" for
which "action [is] required."'39 In contrast, Class 3 sites contain
hazardous wastes but do "not present a significant threat to the
public health or environment" and therefore, according to Title 13,
"action may be deferred." 4 ° In sum, only sites that contain "haz-
ardous wastes" and that present a significant threat to public health
or the environment fall within the ambit of the Title 13 cleanup
program. '
4
Cleanup standards under Title 13 are identical to those adopted in
the 1996 Bond Act since, as noted above, the 1996 Bond Act simply
adopts the Title 13 approach. 42  The clarity of these standards (or
lack thereof) is discussed above. 43 Some observers view the Title
136 See ECL § 27-1305(4)(1)-(5) (McKinney Supp. 1997) (describing the sites eligible for
cleanup under Title 13); see also HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCE REPORT, supra note 64, at 1 ("If the
waste disposed at a site is not a... hazardous waste under the DEC's hazardous waste
management regulatory program's regulations, the site may not be remediated using State
Superfund monies.").
137 See ECL § 27-1305(4) (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1997).
8 ECL § 27-1305 (4)(b)(1) (McKinney 1984).
139 Id. § 27-1305 (4)(b)(2).
140 Id. § 27-1305 (4)(b)(3). Title 13 lists a total of five types of sites. Class 4 and 5 sites are
already remediated, with Class 4 sites continuing to require maintenance, and Class 5 sites
having completed the remedial process. See id. § 27-1305(4)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1997). The
DEC also has administratively created an additional category of sites, known as Class 2A sites.
These are sites which the DEC has identified but for which the DEC has not yet developed
information necessary to place the site into one of the five statutory categories. See N.Y. DEPT
ENVTL. CONSERVATION, DIVISION OF HAZARDOUS WASTE REMEDIATION TAGM, PRIORITY
RANKING SYSTEM FOR CLASS 2 INACTIVE HAZARDOUS WASTE SITES (Dec. 16, 1992); NYCRR tit.
6, § 375-1.8 (1995); see also N.Y. DEP'T ENVTL. CONSERVATION, NEW YORK STATE HAZARDOUS
WASTE SITE REMEDIAL PLAN 5 (July 1996) (discussing the investigation and reclassification of
Class 2A sites).
141 See ECL § 27-1305(4)(b)(1)-(5) (McKinney 1984).
142 See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text (discussing the Bond Act's adoption of the
Title 13 cleanup standards).
143 See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text (noting the lack of consensus regarding
Title 13 cleanup standards). Some close observers of the DEC's Title 13 program are confident
that through its implementation efforts the Department has created a clear set of standards.
See GOVERNOR'S MEMORANDUM, PROGRAM BILL # 46, § 27-1411 (N.Y. 1996) [hereinafter
PROGRAM BILL 46].
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13 cleanup standards as more stringent than the cleanup standards
being used in the VCP discussed below.'"
Finally, on the issue of scope of liability and, related, releases from
liability, the DEC's approach under Title 13 program is more
restrictive than the Department's position under the 1996 Bond Act
or the VCP. 145  The statute's reference to liability is quite limited,
providing simply that the DEC shall "determine which persons are
responsible ... according to applicable principles of statutory or
common law liability" and "[s]uch person[s] shall be entitled to raise
any statutory or common law defense." 46 As a general matter,
some commentators have criticized Title 13's approach to defining
responsible parties and labelled it confusing: "[t]he determination of
who may be a liable party under the statute ... is not an entirely
straightforward matter .... This [the ECL § 27-1313(4)] deference
to general principles was misplaced when it was conceived and
continues to be a source of uncertainty to regulators and the
regulated community alike." 14  For purposes of this Article, the
salient point is that it is clear that Title 13's liability net is wider
than the liability net created under the 1996 Bond Act. For example,
a municipality that owns a site falls within the Title 13 liability
net, '4 while the 1996 Bond Act provides municipalities with a
qualified exemption from liability.
149
144 See, e.g., Voluntary Environmental Cleanup and Economic Development: What Should
Be Done For New York State? Hearing Before the Legislative Commission on Toxic Substances
and Hazardous Wastes (Nov. 21, 1994) (testimony of Joshua Cleland, Environmental Associate,
Scenic Hudson, Inc.) [hereinafter Cleland Testimony] (stating that the VCP "lowers cleanup
standards for contaminated sites in New York State ... [and adding that] [tihe hidden agenda
of the voluntary cleanup program is to weaken New York's hazardous waste cleanup program
at the expense of its citizens and the long-term quality of its resources."); Rabe, supra note 52,
at 38 (stating that the VCP "weaken[s] cleanup levels").
1' See supra notes 110-24 and accompanying text (discussing liability under the 1996 Bond
Act); see also infra notes 166-80 (commenting on liability under the VCP).
146 ECL § 27-1313(4) (McKinney 1984).
147 Ginsberg, supra note 91, §§ 9.17, 9.17.3.
148 See NYCRR tit. 6, § 375-1.3(u)(1) (1995) (defining the term responsible party to include
the owner of a site); Ginsberg, supra note 91, § 9.17.4 (defining responsible parties as poten-
tially including municipalities).
141 See supra Part II (discussing the qualified liability exception for municipalities in the
1996 Bond Act). Few administrative or judicial decisions have interpreted the Title 13
definition of responsible party. In one administrative decision, then DEC Executive Deputy
Commissioner, Langdon Marsh, held that CERCLA case law may be applied in cases under
Title 13. See Estate of William S. Lasdon, No. W3-006-8101, 1994 N.Y. ENV LEXIS 8, at *13
(N.Y. Dep't of Envtl. Conservation Mar. 1, 1994); see also supra note 114 (discussing this case).
A detailed discussion of the liability of the other parties receiving a qualified release under
the 1996 Bond Act (lenders, successors-in-title, and assigns) under the common law and under
CERCLA-based case law is beyond the scope of this Article. See CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607
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2. A Summary of the DEC's "Voluntary Cleanup Program"
(VCP) 50
More than two years after its initiation in 1994, the DEC's
Voluntary Cleanup Program remains in the "development stage," in
the words of one of the DEC architects of the program."5 ' The
(1994) (containing CERCLA's liability scheme). In the fall of 1996, Congress amended this
liability scheme's treatment of lenders in the Asset Conservation, Lender Liability and Deposit
Insurance Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (subtitle E of the
Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act). For a discussion of this Act, see William N.
Buzbee, CERCLA's New Safe Harbors for Banks, Lenders, and Fiduciaries, 26 ENVTL. L. REP.
10656 (Dec. 1996).
.50 For more comprehensive discussions of the DEC's VCP, see Brownfields Subcommittee
of the Hazardous Site Remediation Committee, Summary of Voluntary Cleanup Agreements
Issued by the New York Department of Environmental Conservation Under the Voluntary
Cleanup Program, N.Y. ENVTL. LAW., Fall 1996, at 17 [hereinafter Summary]; Michael W.
Peters, A Practical Guide for Participants in New York's Voluntary Cleanup Program For
"Brownfields," ALB. L. ENVTL. OUTLOOK, Summer/Fall 1996, at 27; Remedial Program, supra
note 50, at 17. For a collection of articles discussing New York's VCP, see Outlook on
Brownfields: Urban Cure or Fields of Dreams?, ALB. L. ENVTL. OUTLOOK, Summer/Fall 1996.
' See Remedial Program, supra note 50, at 30 (stating the VCP "remains in the
development stage"); see also Ginsberg, supra note 91, § 9.31.3 (stating that the DEC's VCP
"is in a state of flux"); David A. Munro, The Challenge of Contaminated Properties for
Municipalities: Potential Liabilities and Creative Approaches to Problems They Pose, 1996
N.Y.S. BAR ASS'N. ENVTL. L. SECTION FALL MEETING 17 (characterizing the VCP as
"evolutionary in nature"); Peters, supra note 150, at 36 (noting that the DEC's VCP is in a
"state of evolution").
While beyond the scope of this Article on the 1996 Bond Act, two issues that go to the legal
bona fides of the Program at least warrant mention. First, there is the question of whether
the DEC's chosen vehicle for administering this Program--essentially a series of guidance
documents that have been revised frequently over the past couple of years-is appropriate, or
whether the DEC should engage in formal rulemaking to establish parameters, both procedural
and substantive, for the Program. If the VCP requires treatment as a rule, SAPA obligates the
DEC to follow a formal "notice and comment" rulemaking process. See PATRICK J. BORCHERS
& DAVID L. MARKELL, NEW YORK STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE § 4.2
(1995). Among other steps, the DEC would be obligated to draft a.proposed rule containing
the VCP, publish it in the State Register for comment, consider and respond to the significant
comments, and publish the final version of the regulation. See N.Y. A.P.A. LAW § 202(1)-(8)
(McKinney 1996 & Supp. 1997). In short, if the VCP is in fact a rule, it would be unenforce-
able in its current form. Perhaps this is one reason why the VCP provides that agreements
entered into under it are enforceable as a matter of contract. See Sullivan, supra note 106, at
1. For a more in-depth discussion of the rulemaking process and the more fundamental
question of what constitutes a rule, see BORCHERS & MARKELL, supra, §§ 4.1-4.23.
The second fundamental issue concerning the VCP involves whether it possibly could run
afoul of constitutional limitations on agency authority. See id. § 5.3. Under the separation of
powers doctrine, the legislature must provide sufficient direction to administrative agencies.
Otherwise, a delegation of legislative authority is overly broad. See id. The validity of agency
actions is also circumscribed by agencies' obligation to act within the scope of their delegated
authority. See id. As Borchers & Markell pointed out elsewhere, the Court of Appeals'
decision in Boreali v. Axelrod, 517 N.E.2d 1350 (N.Y. 1987), "marks an important, but seldom
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evolving quality of the VCP no doubt stems in part from its being an
administrative creation. The VCP is based on general statutory
enactments, rather than a specific statutory enactment, and the DEC
has not issued regulations to clarify the scope of this program or the
nature of the Department's legal authority in administering or
shaping it.' 52 Enactment of the 1996 Bond Act should cause the
DEC and others to reassess the VCP-at least at a conceptual level,
the 1996 Bond Act's Title 5, Title 13 and the VCP should be part of
a "seamless web" in terms of their jurisdiction and approaches to
addressing sites. 5 ' Among other questions, the issue of jurisdic-
tion of the VCP should be reevaluated in light of the enactment of
the 1996 Bond Act, as should central substantive and procedural
elements of the VCP, such as its approach to cleanup standards, the
scope of liability (including releases) and opportunities for public
participation.
In terms of jurisdiction, for example, the VCP overlaps with the
1996 Bond Act. In the latest DEC document describing the VCP
available as this Article was going to press, the Chief of the DEC's
VCP, Charles Sullivan, indicates that the universe of sites eligible
for treatment under the VCP is quite broad.' Mr. Sullivan states
that the VCP "covers any contaminated property located in the
State," unless the federal government has lead responsibility for
crossed, border between permissible regulation and impermissible policy making." See
BORCHERS & MARKELL, supra, § 5.3. At some point, in short, the issue may be raised whether
the DEC has adequate guidance from the Legislature to have embarked on the VCP.
"' See Bakner & Potter, supra note 99, at 7 (stressing that the VCP is only "an
administrative policy and ... does not have the force of a statute or regulation"). One
commentator notes that "New York's [Voluntary Cleanup] program has evolved informally,
without benefit of a statutory or regulatory scheme." Munro, supra note 151, at 15. Along the
same lines, another commentator observed that the VCP "is not set forth in any formal
regulatory process and apparently will remain as simply a part of the DEC's exercise of its
discretionary authority applied on a case-by-case basis." Berger, supra note 43, at 13 (footnote
omitted); see also Summary, supra note 150, at 17 (noting that the VCP "is not based on any
specific statutory authority"). As noted above, the Model VCP Agreement attached to the DEC
Organization and Delegation Memorandum formally inaugurating the VCP, references Title
13 and section 3-0301 of the Environmental Conservation Law as sources of statutory
authority. See MEMO # 94-32, supra note 57, at 1.
A number of VCP-type bills have been offered in the Assembly and Senate over the past few
years, but none have been enacted. For example, the Senate passed The Voluntary
Remediation Act of 1995, S. 3848, 218th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.Y. 1995), the Assembly passed the
Environmental Opportunity Zone Act of 1996, A. 9855, 219th Leg., 2d Sess. (N.Y. 1996), and
the Governor proposed PROGRAM BILL # 46 (June 1995).
... The Brownfields Subcommittee reports finalization of thirty-two VCP agreements "since
the program's inception through the end of September 1996." Summary, supra note 150, at
18.
114 See Sullivan, supra note 106, at 1.
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remediating the property.55 Thus, it is likely that the vast
majority of municipally-owned sites may be addressed under either
the VCP or under the 1996 Bond Act. 5 6  Similarly, the VCP
overlaps with the Title 13 program. Many sites for which cleanup
action is required under the Title 13 program-i.e., a Class 1 or 2
site"'57-may also be handled under the VCP. The only exception
is that "responsible parties" are "ineligible" to participate in the VCP
for such sites, among others.'58
In sum, enactment of the 1996 Bond Act provides the occasion to
revisit the universe of sites which should be handled under the VCP.
The overlapping jurisdiction of the three state remedial
programs, 5 9 combined with the apparently differing approaches
they take to cleanup standards and liability,6 ° discussed below,
highlights the importance of conducting such an appraisal in the
155 Id.
156 See Summary, supra note 150, at 18.
157 See ECL § 27-1305(4)(b)(1)-(5) (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1997) (detailing various site
classifications).
15. Mr. Sullivan defines a responsible party to be a "party responsible under law to
remediate contamination disposed on or released from a property." Sullivan, supra note 106,
at 1. He continues that a "non-PRP" includes the present owner "if that owner purchased the
property in an already contaminated condition and is not otherwise a PRP with respect to the
contamination's remediation." Id.
The DEC document indicates that responsible parties are not eligible to participate in the
VCP for the following types of properties:
A class 1 or 2 Registry site[;] a TSDF subject to corrective action or closure under permit
or order issued under the Department's hazardous waste management regulatory
("RCRA") program[;] a TSDF operating under interim status under the RCRA program
that is subject to enforcement action leading to the issuance of an order containing a
corrective action schedule ... [;] [or any property that] is subject to any other "enforcement
action" requiring the PRP to remove or remediate a hazardous substance. For this
purpose, an "enforcement action" commences against a PRP:
under state law, upon issuance of a notification of violation or upon commencement
of enforcement under Article 71 of the Environmental Conservation Law or upon
issuance of any notification under Article 27, Title 13 of the Environmental
Conservation Law that the PRP is a PRP for the property in question or upon issuance
of an accusatory instrument under the Criminal Procedure Law.
under federal law the purpose of which includes requiring the subject of the action
to remove or remediate hazardous substance, upon issuance of any notification that
requires the removal or remediation of hazardous substances that is issued pursuant
to federal law.
Id. at 1-2.
159 See supra notes 154-58 and accompanying text (noting the circumstances in which
municipal sites may be covered by more than one program).
"60 See supra notes 145-49 and accompanying text (discussing Title 13 liability standards);
supra notes 111-24 and accompanying text (discussing Bond Act liability standards); infra
notes 166-80 and accompanying text (discussing VCP liability standards).
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near future to ensure that the state is acting in a consistent and
equitable way in addressing contaminated properties.,
The VCP is the only program of the three to adopt a clear position
with respect to the role of land use in addressing the issue of cleanup
standards. 1' The VCP comes down squarely on the side of con-
sidering likely uses of the property in determining cleanup stan-
dards, noting that, for example, "[i]f the volunteer contemplates
using the site for industrial/commercial purposes, it will be required
to clean up to a level consistent with the safe use of the property for
those purposes .... .162 Thus, under the VCP, the DEC may
approve a cleanup that does not permit residential use of the
property. As a safeguard, the Department will require the party
conducting the cleanup to place appropriate deed restrictions on the
property.'63 Various commentators have observed, as noted above,
that Title 13's approach to the role of land use in selecting cleanup
standards, adopted by the 1996 Bond Act, provides less certain-
ty.'64 In sum, the DEC appears to be taking a more land use-
driven approach to cleanup standards in its VCP than it is taking
under Title 13 or under the 1996 Bond Act. 165
101 Perhaps because of its evolving character, there is less than complete agreement
concerning the actual substantive content of the VCP. For example, a leader of one active
environmental group states that "[tihe administratively-created [VCP] program is somewhat
of a mystery to the environmental community. It is unclear ... if cleanup levels are always
consistent with State Superfund." Rabe, supra note 52, at 41 (stating that the VCP "weaken[s]
cleanup levels"). The Brownfields Subcommittee Report, under the heading "Flexible Cleanup
Standards," notes that the VCP agreement "will identify site specific cleanup standards that
take into account the specific use of the property," Summary, supra note 150, at 17, and that
the DEC's approach to determining cleanup standards under the VCP may vary depending on
whether the cleanup is being conducted under the Navigation Law or the Environmental
Conservation Law. See id. at 19.
102 Charles E. Sullivan, N.Y. Dep't Envtl. Conservation Voluntary Cleanup Program 2
(undated) [hereinafter Sullivan II]. Mr. Sullivan's Nov. 25, 1996 memorandum similarly
provides that the cleanup objective is that the property be made "safe for the contemplated
use." Sullivan, supra note 106, at 2.
1"' See Sullivan II, supra note 162, at 2 (noting that volunteers must implement institutional
controls, including deed restrictions, that the state deems necessary to allow the contemplated
use).
10' See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text (addressing the ambiguity regarding Title
13 and Bond Act cleanup standards). Not all parties agree that the VCP approach represents
a step in the right direction. See, e.g., Cleland Testimony, supra note 144, at 2-3 (stating that
the VCP "lowers cleanup standards for contaminated sites in New York State ... [and adding
that] [tihe hidden agenda of the voluntary cleanup program is to weaken New York's
hazardous waste cleanup program at the expense of its citizens and the long-term quality of
its resources."); Rabe, supra note 52, at 42 (stating that the VCP "weaken[s] cleanup levels").
.6. The VCP also is less stringent than Title 13 in that the VCP contemplates that non-PRPs
need not remediate wastes that have migrated from the site. See Sullivan, supra note 106, at
2. Their responsibility is limited to addressing the "on-site source only." Id. Regardless of
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Issues concerning the type of liability release parties will receive
for participating in the VCP remain somewhat unsettled. Two
commentators have observed that "[c]urrently, the breadth of
reopener provisions in a particular agreement is subject to
negotiation."166
The VCP's "rules" for participation and governing liability releases
appear to have three essential components, governing: 1) who can
participate;..7 2) the scope of the release from liability provided
upon completion of a cleanup; 6 ' and 3) related to item number 2,
the nature of the "reopener" qualifying the release.6 9 Anyone is
eligible to clean up a property under the VCP, except for "responsible
parties" for certain properties as discussed above. 7 °
Under the VCP, upon satisfactory completion of the cleanup, the
DEC will issue a letter:
declaring that the Department agrees that the volunteer has
cleaned the site to the previously agreed-upon cleanup level
and that, barring an event triggering a reopener, the
Department does not contemplate further action needing to be
taken at the site. It [the Department] will also release the
volunteer from further past contamination remediation
liability, subject to the reopeners."7 '
The type of release the DEC provides varies depending on whether
the volunteer is a PRP. The DEC Voluntary Cleanup Program Chief,
Charles Sullivan, explains the different treatment accorded each
group as follows:
which policy position is preferable, the point is that the level and degree of cleanup required
varies depending on the program involved, even though the types of waste present, or the
degree of risk they pose, may be identical. A conscious decision by the state to use its different
remediation oriented programs as "laboratories" might explain operating separate programs
on parallel tracks. There does not appear to be any indication, however, that systematic
experimenting is underway or the motivating force for the different approaches.
.66 Bakner & Potter, supra note 99, at 9.
167 See Sullivan, supra note 106, at 1-2.
68 See id. at 3-4.
169 See id. (including changing the site's uses, fraudulently obtaining a release, discovering
unknown contamination after the agreement was executed, and realizing that the response
action agreed upon is not sufficiently protective); see infra notes 172-76 (discussing the
reopener provision).
171 See supra note 158 (defining "PRP" and listing the situations in which PRPs are barred
from participating in the VCP).
171 Sullivan, supra note 106, at 3. Under the VCP policy, the DEC also provides a release
to all non-PRP volunteers covering natural resource damages. See id. Mr. Sullivan notes that
"the volunteer's successors and assigns (except the site's PRPs) benefit from the release ....
Also, the reopener affects only the volunteer, successor, or assign which owns or operates the
property at the time of the reopening, and thereafter." Id. at 4.
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While the qualified release, covers onsite and offsite
remedial responsibilities arising out of past contamination,
with respect to a non-PRP volunteer, cleaning up the onsite
contamination triggers the release; and with respect to [a]
PRP volunteer, cleaning up on-site contamination and
addressing offsite impacts trigger the release.172
Liability is re-opened (i.e., the release is not effective) in four
situations: (1) the Department determines that the cleanup does not
allow the contemplated use of the site to occur because the cleanup
is not sufficiently protective; 173 (2) use of the site is changed,
necessitating a more stringent cleanup; 174 (3) "the volunteer
fraudulently obtains the release;" 175 or (4) there were "unknown"
environmental conditions at the site at the time the DEC executed
the voluntary agreement.
176
On balance, the VCP generally appears to be somewhat less
"developer-friendly" than the 1996 Bond Act in terms of liability
protection, although a party's judgment as to which program is
preferable may depend on site-specific conditions. For example,
under the 1996 Bond Act, if the DEC determines that a cleanup was
"not sufficiently protective" to allow safe use of the property, at most
the DEC will require the released party to "take such emergency
measures [as] are necessary to maintain sufficient protection of
human health for such property's current use until such conditions
are addressed.' '177 The DEC will bear the responsibility of return-
ing the property to a "condition sufficiently protective of human
health."'78 In contrast, under the VCP the volunteer bears this
entire responsibility on its own. 179 The indemnification for common
law actions the state provides under the 1996 Bond Act is another
sign that the 1996 Bond Act is more developer-friendly in this area
172 Id. at 3.
'7 See id. at 3.
174 See id. (discussing changes in the site's contemplated use by the volunteer or its
successor).
175 Id.
176 See id. Some commentators have argued that these reopeners greatly limit the value of
a release provided under the VCP. See, e.g., Bakner & Potter, supra note 99, at 7.
177 ECL § 56-0509(4) (McKinney Supp. 1997). This approach under the 1996 Bond Act
applies only to a municipality or a successor-in-title. See id.
178 See supra notes 116-24 and accompanying text (discussing the 1996 Bond Act's reopener
provisions).
179 See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
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than the DEC's VCP policy. 8° It also appears that a release may
become effective under the 1996 Bond Act upon completion of an
investigation, while the DEC provides releases under the VCP only
upon satisfactory completion of the remediation itself. And, finally,
the state provides a release under the 1996 Bond Act, while the VCP
release is provided only by the DEC.
While neither Title 13 nor the NYCRR Part 375 regulations
address the issue of releases, the DEC's intention was probably to
structure the VCP to be more "developer-friendly" than Title 13 for
"non-PRP" volunteers. The VCP releases non-PRP volunteers for off-
site contamination even if the volunteer leaves that contamination
unremediated. 18' Because, as noted above, the DEC relies, in part,
on Title 13 for its statutory authority for the VCP program, at least
for Class 2 sites, the DEC presumably would argue that it has the
authority under the Title 13 program to adopt this relatively
"developer-friendly" approach. 8 2  It has not, however, clearly
enunciated a policy to do so.
Finally, the VCP appears to be more developer-friendly in terms
of public participation, at least for non-Class 2 sites, than is the case
under either Title 13 or the 1996 Bond Act. Under the VCP, the
DEC must provide the public with notice of a voluntary agreement
by publishing a notice in the Environmental Notice Bulletin.
18 3
The DEC will give the public an opportunity to comment on work
plans. 84 Additional opportunities may be included as well.'85
The 1996 Bond Act appears to contemplate a greater level of public
involvement than for non-Class 2 VCP cites.
86
180 See, e.g., Bakner & Potter, supra note 99, at 7 (concluding that "the release contained in
the Bond Act is more comprehensive than that offered by the DEC"). Bakner and Potter
continue, however, that even the 1996 Bond Act reopeners are counterproductive, stating that
"[t]he benefits that could be achieved by returning brownfield sites to productive use will not
be realized fully until the reopener provisions are eliminated." Id. at 8. They suggest that
"[r]eopener provisions effectively squelch the enthusiasm of developers to clean up brownfields
and return the sites to productive use." Id. at 9. They suggest that other than in two
situations--the developer either 1) obtained a release through fraudulent means, or 2) failed
to perform the cleanup as required under the agreement--"reopeners should not be utilized."
See id.
8 See Sullivan, supra note 106, at 2.
182 The DEC also relies on Environmental Conservation Law section 3-0301, among other
sources of authority. See ECL § 3-0301 (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1997).
183 See Sullivan, supra note 106, at 2.
184 See id.
185 See Peters, supra note 150, at 33 (discussing the notice and comment period for the VCP).
188 See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text (discussing citizen participation under the
1996 Bond Act); see also ECL § 56-0503(2)(f).
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On the one hand, there is obviously a logical basis for the VCP's
decision that more extensive citizen involvement is appropriate for
more seriously contaminated sites (Class 2 sites) than for relatively
uncontaminated sites addressed under the VCP. On the other hand,
because of the VCP's land use-based focus, public participation
seemingly would be more important in the remedy selection process
for VCP sites than for 1996 Bond Act or Title 13 sites. 8 7 Similar-
ly, some properties addressed under the 1996 Bond Act will probably
not pose a significant threat to either the environment or people,
while certain properties covered under the VCP will pose such a
threat, even if the latter properties have not been designated as
Class 2 sites under the DEC's Title 13 program. Intuitively, it would
seem more important to encourage public involvement for sites which
pose a significant threat if not addressed properly. Therefore, the
difference in treatment of VCP and 1996 Bond Act sites seems to
warrant reconsideration.
III. CONCLUSIONS
The $1.75 billion 1996 Bond Act represents a substantial state
commitment to financially support a wide variety of environmental
projects. The $200 million Title 5 environmental restoration
program represents a significant additional down payment by the
state on remediating contaminated sites. It seems clear that the
animating concern of the authors of Title 5 was to promote
redevelopment of these sites. The state's commitment to indemnify
municipalities and other, specified parties in connection with
common law actions relating to hazardous substances at the
sites, 8' combined with the creation of the $200 million fund,
evinces the high priority the Act's authors give to such redevelop-
ment. The inclusion of more generous exemptions from liability than
are contained in either of the state's two ongoing remedial programs,
Title 13 or the VCP, is further evidence of the strength of this
commitment.189
.87 To the extent that the DEC adopts identical cleanup approaches under the two programs,
there does not appear to be a logical basis for affording the public less opportunity to
participate under the VCP program than exists under the 1996 Bond Act program.
188 See supra notes 121-24 and accompanying text (detailing the indemnification provisions
of the 1996 Bond Act).
1"9 See supra notes 111-24 and accompanying text (discussing the Bond Act liability
provisions); supra notes 145-49 and accompanying text (detailing Title 13 liability standards);
supra notes 166-80 and accompanying text (discussing the VCP liability standards).
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Whether this bundle of incentives will prove effective. in achieving
the authors' goal of promoting the redevelopment of contaminated
sites cannot yet be gauged, of course. Five possible stumbling blocks
are 1) whether municipalities and developers will find the amount of
time required to complete the process created under the 1996 Bond
Act worth the investment, especially given the "window of oppor-
tunity" character of some development projects and the nature and
structure of the process itself; 2) whether municipalities will be wary
of incurring potential liability for a contaminated property (by taking
ownership) within a structure that requires municipalities to take
ownership prior to the state's making a decision as to whether to
provide a qualified liability release, indemnification protection, and
seventy-five percent of the investigation and remediation costs; 190
3) whether the cleanup standards issue will work itself out in a way
that allows for timely remediation acceptable to developers and
neighbors alike (one facet of this issue will be whether the seemingly
less stringent cleanups allowed under the VCP' will cause
municipalities and others to favor that Program and avoid the 1996
Bond Act); 4) whether the reimbursement provisions upon sale or
lease of the property will limit municipal interest;' 91 and 5)
whether, as some commentators suggest, even the relatively relaxed
liability "reopeners" will create a level of uncertainty sufficient to
deter municipal participation in the program.'92
A sixth issue is whether environmental concerns are as significant
a factor in redevelopment as some suggest. While virtually everyone
seems to be on the brownfields bandwagon at this point in terms of
its upside as a tool to provide redevelopment of urban landscapes,
some observers suggest that environmental issues are not of central
importance to whether brownfields sites are redeveloped or allowed
to deteriorate. In other words, there is the question of whether
providing state funds for remediation of properties will inexorably
lead to the hoped for redevelopment-related benefits that purport to
exist at the end of the remediation rainbow.
Among the other "issues to watch" are two that bear one final
mention. First, there is the possibility that, from an environmental
protection standpoint, the state will have "shot itself in the foot" by
barring use of the $200 million environmental restoration fund for
19o See supra note 79.
191 See supra note 87.
192 See supra notes 110-24 and accompanying text (discussing the Bond Act's liability and
reopener provisions).
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hazardous waste sites that pose a significant threat. 193 Depletion
of the Title 13 Superfund may create a situation that should give
pause to all-the state will be busy spending its money remediating
relatively uncontaminated properties while simultaneously being
unable to address sites that pose truly significant threats to the
environment or citizens of the state.
Second, from a "good government" perspective, enactment of yet
another law to address remediation of contaminated sites should
provide the impetus for a reappraisal of the "architecture" of the
state's legal authorities intended to address these sites. Con-
siderable overlap exists now among the state's three-pronged
approach to dealing with hazardous waste sites. Inconsistency in
approach and inequity of result are the likely offspring of the current
regime. Time invested by the DEC decision makers, legislative
officials and the Governor's office, as well as interested members of
the business and environmental communities, confronting these
issues would be time well spent.
193 See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text (commenting on the ineligibility of Bond
Act funds for use at state Superfund sites that pose significant threats to the environment).
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